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Worldwide, shared water resources continue to attract attention owing to the nature of 
utilization, which often leads to either conflict or co-operation among and between 
countries. This study evaluates the issues of water scarcity among the Nile basin 
countries, the legitimacy of contested water agreements, and their impact on interstate 
relations.   
Among the major findings of the study are; several agreements entered between 
Egypt, Sudan, and  Britain as a colonial power in the region have served as sources of 
conflict over the use of the Nile waters, and Egypt continues to monopolize utilization of 
the Nile waters despite increasing efforts by other riparian states towards a cooperative 
framework for equitable utilization. Moreover, water scarcity in the region results from 
over-consumption of Nile water by Egypt and Sudan, rising populations, and 
environmental changes. Further, the international community, notably the African Union 
and the United Nations have not played significant roles in resolving water disputes in the 
Nile basin.  
Recommendations include, that, alongside pursuing renegotiation of Nile water 
agreements, riparian states need to consider exploring alternative water sources, and 
address rising populations. In addition, the international community needs to take a more 
proactive role in resolving the Nile water dispute. 
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History is replete with cases of conflicts over water, from Old Testament times 
when the Israelites occupied the fertile valleys of the Jordan River basin, to the present. 
In the Cold War period, the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 occurred in part due to a dispute 
over control of the tributaries of the Jordan River, and in 1975, Iraq and Syria almost 
went to war over the flow of the Euphrates River. In 1990, Turkey caused a major crisis 
by blocking the flow of the Euphrates River. These conflicts over water have occurred in 
cases where two or more countries share the resource, and as water scarcity worsens due 
to environmental changes, economic development and rising populations, disputes over 
access to contested water resources will become increasingly acute due to how essential 
water is to human health and survival.1 The Nile River is one such a case. 
Since ancient times, the Nile River has provided nearly all of Egypt's fresh water 
for agriculture, industry and human consumption. All this water comes from nine 
upstream countries: The Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, 
Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and the Sudan (Figure 1). Yet, Egypt's overwhelming 
economic and military might compared to the upstream countries’ lack of capital, limited 
capacity to build dams and waterworks, and internal strife, allows it to wield enormous 
control over how they use the Nile's water resources.2 The combination of ever-
increasing populations, with a rise in the standards of living, economic development and 
climate change, promise to exacerbate the water scarcity in the region, and possibly shift 
the dynamics of power in the Nile basin. 
While the Nile River remains the main source of water for the ten nations that 
make up the Nile basin, its water is barely adequate to satisfy the rising water demands of 
the region. The use of the Nile waters for development is in contention among these 
                                                 
1 Michael T. Klare, Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict (Henry Holt & Company: 
New York, 2001), 138–139. 
  2 Ibid., 148. 
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countries, due in large part to two agreements signed during the colonial era: the 1929 
Nile Water Agreement and the 1959 Agreement for the Full Utilization of the Nile 3  that 
gave Egypt and the Sudan extensive rights over the use of the river. With respect to their 
sovereign territory, the upstream riparian countries have renounced the 1929 agreement 
between Egypt and Great Britain. Further complicating matters, the 1959 bilateral 
agreement made between Egypt and the Sudan to replace the 1929 agreement is flawed 
by allocating the Nile Water to Egypt and Sudan exclusively.4 The upstream countries, 
including Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, have expressed concern over these agreements, 
arguing that they have served to give Egypt unfair control over the use of the river's 
waters.  
While the upstream countries are urging an equitable allocation in the use of the 
Nile waters, Egypt has declared access to the Nile waters a national security priority over 
which it is prepared to go to war. After signing a peace treaty with Israel in 1973, for 
instance, President Anwar Sadat declared, “The only matter that could take Egypt to war 
again is water.”5 Similarly, Former Egyptian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (later 
United Nations secretary-general), Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1980 commented, “The next 
war in our region [North-East Africa] will be over the waters of the Nile, not politics.”6 
This thesis, therefore, will explore the issues of water scarcity to determine whether water 
is likely to lead to inter-state conflict in the region.   
 
                                                 
3 Roberts O. Collins, The Waters of the Nile: Hydro politics and the Jonglei canal, 1900 – 1988 
(Princeton: Markus Weiner Publishers, 1996), 156, 407. 
 4 Michael T. Klare, Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict (Henry Holt & Company: 
New York, 2001), 152–153. 
5 Ibid., 153. 
6 Stephen D. Kiser, “Water: The Hydraulic Parameter of Conflict in the Middle East & North Africa,” 




Figure 1. The Nile basin countries 
From: http://www.nilebasin.org (accessed Aug 28, 2009). 
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B. SCOPE AND PURPOSE 
As noted, the purpose of this thesis is to study control of the Nile River based on 
the existing contested colonial era agreements in order to determine whether water 
scarcity in the Nile River basin countries is likely to lead to inter-state conflict. The scope 
of the study is to evaluate the water scarcity in the riparian countries, and to examine the 
details of the contested water agreements vis-à-vis the provisions of Article 5 of the 
United Nations Convention on the non-navigational use of watercourses. Consequently, 
the study will provide recommendations to renegotiate the agreements, and suggest 
strategies to mitigate the effects of water scarcity. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In analyzing the likelihood of actual inter-state combat among the Nile basin 
countries, the thesis answers the following question: Under what conditions are water 
scarcity and contested water agreements likely to lead to interstate conflict? The nested 
questions are: 
1. What is the extent of water scarcity among the Nile basin countries? 
2. What is the legitimacy of the current Nile Water Agreements? 
3. Moreover, what are the implications of the current state of affairs for the 
upstream riparian countries and Egypt? 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN AND EVIDENCE 
This study will employ qualitative research and process tracing to demonstrate the 
likelihood of interstate conflict among the Nile basin countries due to water scarcity and 
illegitimate agreements, and suggest possible ways that the upstream riparian states could 
break Egyptian hegemony over the Nile waters.  
To establish the extent of water scarcity, demand- induced and supply-induced 
scarcity have to be evaluated to determine the amount of water available per person. 
According to Peter H. Gleick (1993) quoted in Michael T. Klare (2001), and Yohannes 
Okbazghi (2008), annual per capita water availability in selected states would 
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significantly drop due to population growth as shown by comparing 1990 amounts to 
amounts projected for 2025 ( in cubic meters). In Burundi, the drop will be from 660 to 
280, in Egypt 1070 to 620, Ethiopia 2360 to 900, Tanzania 2780 to 900, Kenya 590 to 
1907, and Rwanda from 880 to 350.8  
Moreover, according to World Resources Institute (1998) the anticipated 
population growth in selected countries in millions between 1998 and 2025 is: Egypt 65.7 
to 95.8, Ethiopia 62.1 to 136.3, Kenya 29.0 to 50.2, the Sudan 28.5 to 46.9, and Uganda 
21.3 to 45.0.9 Increasing the likelihood of violent conflict is the Nile’s critical importance 
to Egypt “. . . [Egypt] gets no usable rain and has no other water but a few rapidly 
diminishing aquifers under the desert. Only 2% of Egypt is not desert, and water stress is 
rising every month. Egypt’s 65 million people, climbing to 75 million by 2010, are 
entirely dependent on the river [Nile]. . . . Egypt would experience a 16 to 30 percent 
water deficit by the end of the century.”10 The above scenario illustrates how important 
the Nile waters are to Egypt and further demonstrates how population growth is likely to 
exert pressure on available water resources from the Nile. 
In Chapter II, the concept of “The Rule of Equitable Utilization”11 will be 
introduced to explain the structural scarcity of water created by Egyptian hegemony. 
Article 5 of the United Nations convention on the non-navigational uses of international 
watercourses provides a solution to the contradictory doctrines of absolute territorial 
sovereignty, which favors the upstream riparian states’ “natural rights”, and the absolute 
integrity of the river, which favors the downstream riparian states’ “acquired rights.”12 
                                                 
7 Yohannes Okbazghi, Water Resources and Inter-riparian Relations in the Nile Basin: The Search for 
an Integrative Discourse (State University of New York: Albany, 2008), 5. 
8 Michael T. Klare, Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict (Henry Holt & Company: 
New York, 2001), 147. 
9 Ibid., 157. 
10 Marq De Villiers, Water: The Fate of Our Most Precious Resource (New York: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 2000), 219–220. 
 11 FAO-UN, “Sources of International water law” (Rome: Development Law Service, 1998), 29.  
ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/005/w9549e/w954900.pdf  (accessed Sep 03, 2009). 
 12 Ibid., 29–31.  
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These ‘acquired rights’ are what the upper riparian states object to since, “To accept 
Egypt’s historic rights [is] to admit to the primacy of Egypt’s future needs . . .”13 
The current structural scarcity of water imposed by Egypt on the upper riparian 
states is evident in the 1959 Full Utilization of the Nile Waters Agreement between Egypt 
and the Sudan. Of the Nile’s annual average water yield of 84 milliards, the Sudan and 
Egypt allocated themselves 18.5 milliards and 55.5 milliards respectively.14 It was 
estimated that the balance of 10 milliards would be lost through seepage and evaporation 
along the course of the Nile’s flow. While disregarding the upper riparian states in the 
water allocation, Egypt and Sudan established a Technical Commission to undertake any 
negotiations concerning the Nile waters with any riparian state outside the boundaries of 
the two republics.  
Further, the two countries agreed that their two governments would sanction any 
redistribution of water and the accepted amount to be allotted to any other riparian state 
would be deducted from the shares of the two republics in equal parts. While this 
agreement unified Egypt and the Sudan against other riparian states on the issue of Nile 
water control, it revealed Egypt’s dependence on the Nile with a special provision for 
water loans from the Sudan to enable it to proceed with its agricultural expansion. 
An analysis of possible strategies to break Egyptian hegemony over the Nile 
waters will be presented in Chapter V. To address structural scarcity, possible 
recommendations for the upstream states include pressure on Egypt through regional and 
international organizations to renegotiate the agreements, such as bringing the case to the 
International Court of Justice for arbitration as a human rights issue or for compensation, 
as happened in the Danube river case between Hungary and Slovakia over the Gabcikovo 
dam in 1997.15 
As for strategies to address supply- and demand-induced scarcities, these include 
the need to address rising populations and reduce the poverty levels that contribute to 
                                                 
 13 Roberts O. Collins, The Waters of the Nile: Hydro politics and the Jonglei canal, 1900 – 1988 
(Princeton: Markus Weiner Publishers, 1996), 157. 
 14 Ibid., 407. 
15 FAO-UN, “Sources of International water law” (Rome: Development Law Service, 1998), 32. 
ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/005/w9549e/w954900.pdf  (accessed Sep 03, 2009). 
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destruction of water catchment areas as people look for sources of livelihood. Other 
possible strategies include the implementation of laws to regulate/prohibit water pollution 
and degradation, joint conservation policies by all riparian states, as well as address the 
development of means to any conflicts on shared resources from a human rights 
perspective.  
E. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Conceptual Literature  
Historically, water has been used for development, as a source of conflict or for 
defense purposes. Nebuchadnessar of Babylon used a system of canals in the defense of 
the city whereas Sennacherib of Assyria destroyed Babylon in 689 BC as retribution for 
the death of his son by destroying the water supply canals to the city. In South Africa in 
1990, a pro-apartheid council cut off water to the Wesselton Township of 50,000 blacks 
following their protest over miserable sanitation and living conditions.16 Some scholars 
argue that scarcity under certain conditions could lead to conflict while others say that 
scarcity will be resolved through compromise. According to A. T. Wolf (2002), water 
resource inequities between states could lead to conflicts and more poverty, and 
shortened lives, while the increase in the likelihood of international disputes, could create 
more refugees who cross borders and decrease the ability of a country to resist economic 
and military activities by neighboring countries.17   
Klare (2002) and Kiser (2000) argue that water scarcity, together with other 
variables, such as rapid population growth, affluence, economic expansion, ill-defined 
water laws, and previously existing tensions, are especially likely to generate conflict 
between / among nations over a shared water resource.18 Kiser’s analysis of the Jordan 
water basin reveals that the potential for conflict is partly due to a power differential 
                                                 
16 Wolf, A.T., Conflict Prevention & Resolution in Water Systems, (Masachusetts: Edward Elger 
Publishers, 2002).156. 
 17 Ibid., 161–162. 
 18 Stephen D. Kiser, “Water: The Hydraulic parameter of Conflict in the Middle East & North 
Africa,” INSS occasional paper 35, (USAF Institute for National Security Studies USAF Academy: 
Colorado, Sep 2000), 6. 
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between the upstream countries and the downstream countries where the downstream 
countries are more powerful than the upstream countries and perceive their access to 
water as jeopardized by the activities of the upstream countries.19 This camp of scholars 
who argue that water scarcity is likely to lead to conflict among co-riparian states do not 
consider the situation in which states are bound by water treaties which favor one group 
to the detriment of others.  
In contrast, Aaron Wolf (2002) argues that water scarcity is likely to lead to 
compromise and cooperation rather than conflict. His view is that since water is so 
essential to life, hostile co-riparian countries have historically sought compromise rather 
than war over water.20 Peter Gleick also argues that water scarcity acts as a catalyst for 
cooperation rather than conflict as it drives the need for joint management of shared 
water resources. Mostafa Dolatyar and Tim S Gray further argue that a single riparian 
state cannot monopolize or subject a water resource to its control.  In fact, they assert that 
states have realized that cooperation over water sharing is not a zero-sum game, but could 
be a win-win situation.21 According to Wolf, most societies have sought to evolve subtle, 
often unwritten rules for collaboratively managing shared water resources for the 
common good.22 What these pro-cooperation or compromise scholars fail to address, 
however, is situations in which riparian states are faced with contentious treaties. 
2. Empirical Literature 
In attempting to find out who is right between the conflict and compromise 
theorists, this thesis will examine empirical data related to the typology presented in 
Table 1 to evaluate the claims of each side. The Nile River presents a case of high 
scarcity and low legitimacy of existing agreements. Arguably, water scarcity due to 
                                                 
  19 Stephen D. Kiser, “Water: The Hydraulic parameter of Conflict in the Middle East & North 
Africa,” INSS occasional paper 35, (USAF Institute for National Security Studies USAF Academy: 
Colorado, Sep 2000), 30. 
 20 Aaron Wolf, “Development and Transboundary Waters: Obstacles and Opportunities.” 
[http://www.dams.org]. December 2002. 
  21 Mostafa Dolatyar & Tim. S. Gray, Water Politics in the Middle East: A context for conflict or 
cooperation?  (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 117, 156. 
 22 Aaron Wolf, “Indigenous Approaches to Water Conflict Negotiations and Implications for 
International Waters.” [http://www.transboundarywters.orst.edu.documents/indigenous]. December 2002. 
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increasing populations, growing economic development, and worsening drought 
conditions, combined with pre-existing tensions that have at times led to proxy wars, 
point to an increasing potential for interstate conflict among the Nile basin countries. 
Moreover, the ill-defined international water laws that have sustained the controversy 
over the contested Nile water agreements make the possibility of conflict even more 
likely. Aside from the contested 1929 water agreement between Egypt and Britain, which 
practically speaking worked solely for the benefit of Egypt,23 the 1959 Full utilization of 
the Nile Waters Agreement between the Sudan and Egypt is being overtaken by both 
countries indicating their need for greater amounts of water to continue economic 
development and feed their ever-increasing populations.24 In the Nile basin case, this 
thesis will argue that inter-state conflict will result from supply-and demand-induced 
scarcities catalyzed by structurally induced scarcity as illustrated in Figure 2. 
While non-integration via international organizations increases the probability of 
countries engaging in inter-state conflict due to a lack of sufficiently effective arbitration 
mechanisms, this factor may not play a significant role in the Nile basin since all the 
riparian countries subscribe to the United Nations and the African Union.  
Again, the Nile control debate has not been a priority for Nile basin countries with 
internal conflicts. But as these countries emerge from political instability, their re-focus 
on economic development will bring to the fore the need for water as they embark on 
suspended hydroelectricity projects and irrigation schemes. Ethiopia and Uganda, for 
instance, are considering new agricultural developments and new hydroelectric projects 
respectively.25 The political stability in these countries will also mean that they could 
initiate coalitions to counter Egypt’s threats and intimidation. 
 
 
                                                 
  23 Roberts O. Collins, The Waters of the Nile: Hydro politics and the Jonglei canal, 1900 – 1988 
(Princeton: Markus Weiner Publishers, 1996), 156. 
 24 Stephen D. Kiser, “Water: The Hydraulic parameter of Conflict in the Middle East & North 
Africa,” INSS occasional paper 35, (USAF Institute for National Security Studies USAF Academy: 
Colorado, Sep 2000), 43. 
  25 Michael T. Klare, Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict (Henry Holt & 
Company: New York, 2001), 154–155. 
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Figure 2. Theoretical Framework 
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Table 1.   Model 
F. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS 
The 1959 Nile water agreement between Sudan and Egypt did not put an end to 
the dispute over the rights to the Nile waters, and strong tensions exist between the Nile 
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basin countries over any proposal for the utilization of Nile river water. In view of the 
development plans in each of the riparian countries, especially Ethiopia and Sudan, the 
scarcity of water is clear. The World Water Development Report outlines water scarcity 
in the region as follows, “Of 180 countries listed for water availability per person per 
year . . ., Kenya is ranked 154th, Uganda 115th and Ethiopia 137th. The upstream 
countries of Egypt and Sudan are ranked 156th and 129th, respectively.”26 In addition, 
Egypt, as the country most in danger of losing access to the Nile waters by development 
projects in other countries, remains willing and able to intervene militarily to maintain the 
status quo.  
The goal of this study is to assess the likelihood of conflict in the light of 
increasing water scarcity and existing illegitimate water agreements. One conclusion it 
will draw is that water scarcity is likely to lead to interstate conflict between the riparian 
countries. High population growth coupled with improved standards of living in the 
region will lead to the need for increased water withdrawal from the Nile. Other factors 
that will contribute to scarcity include regional drought, climate change, and accelerated 
economic development. The population growth rates per year in some of the countries 
are: Ethiopia 3.2 percent, Uganda 2.6 percent, Kenya and Sudan 2.2 percent. At the same 
time, estimates suggest Egypt’s population will grow by 30 million people between 1998 
and 2025.27 
This thesis will also assess the likelihood of inter-state conflict if the upstream 
countries renounce the existing Nile water agreements. The usage of the Nile River has 
been associated with Horn of Africa politics for many decades. Kenya, Uganda and 
Tanzania have voiced concern over the legitimacy of the colonial-era agreements arguing 
that Egypt has been able to industrialize by using the Nile water to generate electricity 
and undertake irrigation while preventing usage by the upstream countries through 
                                                 
 26 United Nations World Water Development Report (March 16, 2009) 
http://www.unesco.org/water/wwap/wwdr  (accessed July 17, 2009). 
  27 Michael T. Klare, Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict (Henry Holt & 
Company: New York, 2001), 156. 
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military threat and intimidation. Uganda in 2002, for instance, advanced a claim for an 
annual compensation of U.S. $1.2 million from Egypt.28  
G. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
The present chapter represents my introduction to the problem; it sets out the 
broad issues of control over the Nile, and brings into focus the likelihood of inter-state 
conflict due to water scarcity in the region and the contested water agreements. Chapter II 
highlights the nature of the area under study—geography and climate—in respective 
sections of the Nile River. It also analyzes the water contributions to the Nile by 
respective states against their allocation/needs. Chapter III presents the history of control 
over the Nile in the pre-colonial period, describes the colonial treaties on utilization of 
Nile water, and discusses their impact on inter-state relations. This chapter also looks at 
the existing international water laws and their controversies. Chapter IV explains 
Egyptian hegemony over the Nile and analyzes past attempts by the upstream states to 
jointly manage and equitably utilize the Nile waters. Chapter V addresses the present 
situation with a focus on the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), which seeks to achieve 
management and utilization of the Nile waters. Chapter VI summarizes the key issues 
discussed in the study, and offers recommendations to mitigate water scarcity across the 








                                                 
  28 Science in Africa, “The Nile: Water Conflicts” (May 2003), 
http://www.scienceinafrica.co.za/2003/may/nile.htm  (accessed July 17, 2009). 
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II. DESCRIPTION OF AREA OF STUDY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Nile basin, an area extending from the “Greater Horn of Africa” to the Great 
Lakes region, is ecologically vulnerable to recurrent drought and famine. It is also an area 
prone to internal and inter-state conflicts. Although most countries in the region have 
historically viewed water as a low policy priority, the rising demand for freshwater 
coupled with its shrinking supply is increasingly pushing the importance of water 
resources to the top of national policy priorities.29  
Demand-induced scarcity, caused by either population growth or an increase in 
per capita consumption, is worsening. Population growth, for example, requires not only 
an increase in the supply of potable water, but also accelerated agricultural and industrial 
development, in proportion to the rising demands of the expanding population. Estimates 
point to the fact that per capita water availability (in cubic meters) in the Nile basin 
countries will significantly fall between 1990 and 2025 due to rising populations: Egypt 
from 1,070 to 620, Ethiopia from 2,360 to 900, Tanzania from 2,780 to 900, Kenya from 
590 to 190, Rwanda from 880 to 350, and Burundi from 660 to 28030. Moreover, apart 
from supply-induced and demand-induced scarcities, the geopolitical description of Nile 
water resources by Egypt has created structural scarcity thanks to its use of relative 
superior military capability to deter other riparian states from utilizing Nile waters, as 
well as influencing the allocation of water in its favor. Thomas Homer-Dixon and Jessica 
Blitt aptly describe these scarcities using a “pie” metaphor. 
Supply-induced scarcity, arising from a reduction in the quality and 
quantity of the resource, shrinks the size of the resource pie as a whole; 
demand-induced scarcity arising, for example, from growth in the number 
of people competing for the resource pie, causes the average size of each  
 
                                                 
  29 Okbazaghi Yohannes, Water Resources and Inter-riparian Relations in the Nile basin: The Search 
for an Integrative Discourse, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2008), 5. 
 30 Ibid., 5–6. 
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person’s slice of the pie to shrink; and structural scarcity, arising from 
unequal distribution puts large slices in the hands of a few, thus 
diminishing the amount available to the rest.31 
The Great Lakes region and Ethiopian highlands are sources of the White Nile 
and Blue Nile tributaries respectively, which together form the Nile River. The water of 
the Blue Nile originates from Ethiopia and Eritrea and makes up approximately 85 
percent of the Nile water. The water of the White Nile, on the other hand, originates from 
the Great Lakes countries of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda, 
Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya, and makes up approximately 15 percent of the 
total volume of the Nile waters. Notwithstanding these contributions, Sudan and Egypt, 
by a bilateral agreement signed in 1959, exclusively utilize the Nile water. The existing 
Nile water treaties do not allocate any water to the upstream states in spite of the fact that 
these countries are the sources and major contributors to the Nile’s waters. Figure 3 
depicts this interaction. 
Figure 3. Nile water contribution/use interaction 
                                                 
31 Thomas Homer-Dixon and Jessica Blitt, Ecoviolence: Links Among Environment, Population, and 
Security (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998), 6. 
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B. WATER SITUATION IN THE REGION  
In 1996, United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) assessed that, in the 
future, disputes over water supplies would be a cause of conflict among nations, 
especially in the Middle East and North Africa, where the available water per capita 
averages 1247 cubic meters per year, compared to 18742 cubic meters in North America 
and 23103 cubic meters in Latin America. Most of the Nile basin countries are known for 
their arid and semi-arid conditions—Egypt (98 per cent desert), Ethiopia, Sudan, and 
Kenya, receiving between 200 and 800 mm/year of variable rainfall. Precipitation in the 
region varies from zero in the Horn of Africa to more than 4000 mm/year in the Sudan’s 
Western Equatorial region.32 To illustrate the future water situation in Africa, Figure 4 
illustrates UNEP’s prediction of water stress. According to UNEP, Egypt, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Rwanda, and Burundi will experience water scarcity by 2025, while Uganda, 
Tanzania, and Eritrea will be under water stress. 
Apart from low precipitation in the region, the mean annual flow of the Nile 
waters is steadily decreasing: Between 1870 and 1899 – 110 billion cubic meters (bcm), 
between 1900 and 1959 – 84 bcm, between 1977 and 1978 – 72 bcm. Although the 1959 
Sudan-Egypt bilateral agreement on the full utilization of the Nile based its water 
allocation on the 1959 mean annual flow, the flow has significantly diminished since 
then.33 Even in 1959, Egypt had to loan 1.5 milliards of water from the Sudan for it to 
proceed with agricultural expansion.34 The Nile basin countries’ water budget is rapidly 
decreasing with the rise in population, with Egypt worst hit.  In 1960, with a population 
of 30 million, the per capita annual water availability was 2100 cubic meters, dropping to 
792 cubic meters in 2003 with a population that had risen to 72 million. The projection is 
that by 2025, the per capita annual water available will be 337 cubic meters for a 
                                                 
 32 Diana Rizzolio Karyabwite, “Water Scarcity in the Nile River Valley” (UNEP/DEWA/GRID – 
Geneva, 2000), 6–7. 
  33 Okbazaghi Yohannes, Water Resources and Inter-riparian Relations in the Nile basin: The Search 
for an Integrative Discourse, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2008), 42. 
 34 Roberts O. Collins, The Waters of the Nile: Hydro politics and the Jonglei canal, 1900 – 1988 
(Princeton: Markus Weiner Publishers, 1996), 412–413. 
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population of 90 million.35 The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 
definition of water scarcity is a situation of less than 1000 cubic meters of water per 
capita per year, and water stress is a situation in which the per capita water availability 
per year is between 1000 and 1700 cubic meters.  
 
Figure 4. Water stress and scarcity in the Nile basin 
From http://www.grid.unep.ch/activities/sustainable/nile/nilereport.pdf (accessed Sep 21, 
2009). 
 
                                                 
 35 Okbazaghi Yohannes, Water Resources and Inter-riparian Relations in the Nile basin: The Search 
for an Integrative Discourse, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2008), 41. 
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A similar situation afflicts the other Nile basin riparian states, which have faced 
worsening drought conditions and famine. For instance, between 1965 and 2006 Ethiopia 
has experienced six major droughts with the worst droughts being those of 1983–1984 
and the 2002–2003. The cycles of drought and famine have made Ethiopia dependent on 
international food aid, yet it is the source of 85 per cent of the Nile’s water. In Kenya, 
due to irregular rainfall, food production—especially of the staple grain, maize—has 
been falling. Kenya saw a 22 per cent decrease in 2000 from the 1998 harvest and a 36 
per cent decrease from the 1999 harvest—leading to imports and appeals for international 
food aid.36  
Against the emergence of water stress and scarcity in the Nile basin countries, 
Egypt’s and Sudan’s attempt to increase the White Nile flow by about 2.5 billion cubic 
meters through construction of the Jonglei Canal to drain the Sudd swamp37 in southern 
Sudan is unlikely to succeed. The Jonglei Canal Project was conceived by Egypt and 
Sudan as part of the 1959 bilateral Nile Water Utilization agreement with the aim of 
increasing flow, producing hydroelectric power, mitigating flood effects, and permitting 
controlled irrigation.38 Although the project started in 1978, the Sudanese People’s 
Liberation Army (SPLA), acting on southern Sudanese objections to the project, attacked 
the construction workers in 1983, bringing the project to a halt. Southern Sudanese, led 
by the late Colonel John Garang, had argued that draining the swamp would accelerate 
the southward expansion of the Sahara Desert, and destabilize the livelihoods of the 
indigenous communities by altering the ecological balance of the area. According to the 
International Crisis Group, “Multiple ethnic communities migrate seasonally [to the Sudd 
swamp to access water and grazing areas] to sustain cattle and preserve their pastoralist  
 
                                                 
 36 Okbazaghi Yohannes, Water Resources and Inter-riparian Relations in the Nile basin: The Search 
for an Integrative Discourse, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2008), 103. 
 37 Marq De Villiers, Water: The Fate of Our Most Precious Resource (New York: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 2000), 220. 
 38 Arun P. Elhance, Hydropolitics in the Third World: Conflict and Cooperation in International River 
Basins (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1999), 72. 
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way of life.”39 The Southern Sudanese also feared that the Muslim North and Egypt 
intended to displace the nomadic communities of the south and instead bring-in Muslim 
Egyptians to settle in the Sudd region.40  
 The SPLA’s concerns are now shared by the international community, not least 
the upper riparian states, which fear that draining the swamp would result in changes in 
weather and rainfall patterns in the region, and flooding in the Sobat Valley in Ethiopia. 
Resumption of the project is contingent upon the territorial integrity of Sudan and, even 
more importantly, the goodwill of southern Sudanese because what helped heighten 
Southern Sudanese resentment of the project was that the “. . . Sudanese government in 
Khartoum, long accustomed to treating the south as a virtual colony, paid no attention to 
the fears and concerns of the southerners, and it proceeded to construct the project with 
the help of the French Consortium.”41 Other riparian states are also unlikely to agree to 
the canal’s construction due to the likely environmental effects to the region. 
C. WHAT ARE THE PROSPECTS IN INTERSTATE RELATIONS? 
As the contentiousness over development of the Jonglei Canal suggests, each of 
the riparian countries, especially Ethiopia and Sudan, are already experiencing water 
scarcity. In 1997, the World Bank assessed that:  
the waters of the Nile probably constitute Ethiopia’s greatest natural asset 
for development. . . . The development of the River Nile in Ethiopia has 
the potential to contribute significantly to poverty reduction, meet 
domestic power and food demands, and become a cornerstone of a future 
Ethiopian export strategy.42 
 
                                                 
 39 International Crisis Group, “Jonglei’s Tribal Conflicts: Countering Insecurity in South Sudan” 
(Africa Report No 154, December 23, 2009), 1 http://www.crisisgroup.org (accessed Feb 09, 2010). 
  40 Arun P. Elhance, Hydropolitics in the Third World: Conflict and Cooperation in International 
River Basins (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1999), 73. 
  41 Ibid., 73−74. 
 42 Haggai Erlich, The Cross and the River: Ethiopia, Egypt, and the Nile (London: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2002), 7. 
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 The Word Bank’s assessment reflects the importance with which Ethiopia, and 
most other upstream states, view the Nile waters, and begs the question whether any state 
is willing to give up what it should be its Nile waters to Egypt in the face of poverty, 
hunger, and underdevelopment. 
The ratification of Articles 5 and 7 of the United Nations Convention on the Non-
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, and the development of a mechanism to 
enforce it may lead to a compromise situation. The Articles describe countries’ rights to 
equitable utilization, duty to cooperate in watercourse protection and development, 
appropriate measures to prevent significant harm to other nations along the watercourse, 
and direct that, if harm is caused, there be consultation with regard to compensation. In 
effect, the convention offers a bridge between the divergent water law principles of  
absolute territorial integrity, or the principle of prior appropriation (“acquired rights”) 
which favors the downstream states, and the principle of absolute territorial sovereignty 
(“natural rights”) which favors the upstream states, by offering limited territorial integrity 
and limited territorial sovereignty to address the common good.43  
On the one hand, the principle of absolute territorial integrity favors the 
downstream states because it allows them to accuse or censure the upstream states for any 
measures they take whose effect is disadvantageous to the downstream states’ territories. 
The principle of absolute territorial sovereignty, on the other hand, is advantageous to the 
upstream states since it holds water bodies as integral parts of a state’s territory. The 
“prior appropriation” principle, although favoring neither the upstream states nor the 
downstream states, protects the rights of use for any state which first utilized the water. In 
the case of the Nile basin countries, Egypt and Sudan defend their position with regard to 
the utilization of the Nile water citing the principles of “prior appropriation” and absolute 
territorial integrity. Although the upstream states could base their rights to Nile water use 
                                                 
 43 FAO-UN, “Sources of International water law” (Rome: Development Law Service, 1998), 29 – 31. 
ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/005/w9549e/w954900.pdf  (accessed Sep 03, 2009). 
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on the principle of absolute territorial sovereignty, they have chosen to pursue 
cooperative negotiation for equitable utilization.44 
D. HYDROLOGIC DATA 
Up till the 20th century, the periodic rise of Nile water levels was not well 
understood. The only means of data collection was ancient Egyptian nilometres, 
described as “gauges formed by graduated scales cut in natural rocks or in stone walls”45 
on the banks of the Nile. In 1993, the Technical Cooperation Commission for the 
Promotion and Development of the Nile (TECCONILE) was established with the support 
of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) to promote inter-state 
cooperation. It also sought to address the scarcity of hydrological data on the Nile, as 
well as updating what there was and developing an Atlas of the Nile basin, which would 
focus on water resources and their use.  
Negotiations between TECCONILE and the World Meteorological Organization 
(WMO) for a Nile Hydrological Cycle Observation System for the Nile basin led to the 
availability of the data we have today, which consists of information about climate, 
precipitation, solar radiation, soil properties, vegetation, and socio-economic factors such 
as population, agriculture, industries, and land use. Most Nile basin countries consider the 
TECCONILE-initiated data to be credible compared to data generated in the past by 
Egypt through readings done at the Aswan High Dam, and at Owen Falls Dam, Uganda. 
Since the 1929 Nile treaty, Egyptian engineers and hydrologists have remained stationed 
at Jinja hydroelectric plant with the principal aim of ensuring that Uganda’s use of Lake 
Victoria’s waters is non- consumptive.46 
                                                 
 44 Peter Kagwanja, “Calming the Waters: The East African Community and Conflict over the Nile 
Resources” (Pretoria: Journal of Eastern African Studies, 1; 3, 321 – 337, Nov 2007), 331 http://dx.doi.org  
(accessed Nov 12, 2009). 
 45  FAO-UN, “Sources of International water law” (Rome: Development Law Service, 1998), 26 
ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/005/w9549e/w954900.pdf  (accessed Sep 03, 2009). 
 46 Okbazaghi Yohannes, Water Resources and Inter-riparian Relations in the Nile basin: The Search 
for an Integrative Discourse, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2008), 121. 
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E. IMPORTANCE OF THE NILE WATER AND INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY 
CONTRIBUTION VIS-À-VIS NEEDS 
1. Egypt 
Agriculture consumes approximately 80 per cent of the water in developing 
countries, most of it through irrigation. Presently, Egypt has a cultivable land area of 3.4 
million hectares and plans to increase this to 4.6 million hectares by 2017 with the 
completion of two irrigation projects—the Southern Valley and the North Sinai 
Development projects.47 The Nile River enables Egypt to irrigate 99.8 per cent of its 
cropland, assuring self-sufficiency in agricultural commodities less cereals, oil, and 
sugar.48 Apart from agricultural production, the Nile supports Egyptian transportation, 
industry, energy production, and employment, with over 40 percent of its work force 
engaged in farming.49 Egypt’s total dependence on the Nile is evident by the 
congregation of its entire population along the Nile Valley and in the Delta area, which 
represents only four percent of the country’s land area.  
In defense of its claim of historical rights over the Nile’s water, Egypt not only 
maintains the sanctity of the colonial treaties and continues to be reluctant to accept the 
upstream states’ water allocation claims, but also continues to engage in desert-land 
reclamation policy for irrigation. Egypt’s reclamation policy is likely to complicate future 
allocation negotiations since it entrenches Egypt’s prior use rights. Moreover, the desert 
irrigation plan, “would increase Egyptian dependency on the Nile and intensify Egypt’s 
commitment to exploit its ‘historic rights’ to the fullest.”50 Worth bearing in mind again, 
is that 97 percent of Egypt’s water resources originate from upstream countries, a 
                                                 
 47 Okbazaghi Yohannes, Water Resources and Inter-riparian Relations in the Nile basin: The Search 
for an Integrative Discourse, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2008), 38. 
 48 Aquasat Survey, “Irrigation in Africa in figures – Egypt” (2005), 2 
http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/countries/egypt/egypt.pdf  (accessed Oct 18, 2009). 
  49 “Ethiopia and Egypt dispute the Nile” (BBC News, Feb 24, 2005), 1 and 2, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr-/2/hi/science/nature/4274757.stm  (accessed Oct 15, 2009). 
  50 Haggai Erlich, The Cross and the River: Ethiopia, Egypt, and the Nile (London: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2002), 214. 
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situation which also holds true for Sudan, with 77 percent of Sudan’s water resources 
originating outside its borders,51 as depicted in Tables 2–4. 
Table 2.   Contribution and consumption of Nile water by states 
Country or region Water contribution Water use 
Egypt 0 55.5 billion cubic meters 












1.0 billion cubic meters 
Great Lakes States 14% 1.7 billion cubic meters 
Source: Country paper, VIIth Nile 2002 conference. 
 
Table 3.   Hydropower potential in the Nile Countries in megawatts (MW) 
Country Existing hydropower Potential hydropower 
Burundi 40 MW 120 MW 
DRC 21 MW 2600 MW 
Egypt 2845 MW …………… 
Ethiopia 1000 MW 6000 MW 
Eritrea ……………… …………… 
Kenya 2 MW 355 MW 
Rwanda 34 MW 121 MW 
Sudan 238 MW 1380 MW 
Tanzania 377 MW 4500 MW 
Uganda 180 MW 1532 MW 
Source: Country paper, VIIIth Nile conference 2002 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
 
 
                                                 
 51 Debay Tadesse, “The Nile: Is it a curse or a blessing” (Institute for Security Studies paper 174, Nov 
2008), 2. 
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Table 4.   Irrigation potentiality in the Nile basin countries 
Country Irrigation potential (ha) Area already under 
irrigation (ha) 
Burundi 80.00 0 
Egypt 4 420.000 3 078.000 
Eritrea 150.000 15 124 
Ethiopia 2 220.000 23 160 
Kenya 180.000 6.000 
Rwanda 150.000 2.000 
Sudan 2 750.000 1 935200 
Tanzania 30.000 10.000 
Uganda 202.000 9120 
DRC 10.000 0 
Total 10 192.000 5 078604 
Source: Irrigation potential in Africa, FAO 1997. 
2. Sudan 
Sudan’s Gezira irrigation scheme, which accounts for 60 per cent of the country’s 
foreign earnings, draws its water supply from the Nile. The scheme’s inception was 
motivated by the British colonial desire to enable Sudan to sustain its colonial 
administration through the development of an exportable commodity—cotton, which 
supplied British textile mills and generated revenue for Sudan.  Sudan’s arable potential 
is estimated at 84 million hectares, of which 60.5 million are in the Nile basin. 
Hydroelectric power for Sudan is drawn from the Nile at Roseires dam.  
Sudan receives water from the Blue and White Nile, and Atbara river, and serves 
as a transitional storage for Egypt. However, in the South, the Sudd swamp retains about 
14 billion cubic meters of the White Nile flow, which disappears via evaporation and 
seepage. Sudan’s use of the Nile River is the second heaviest after Egypt, amounting to 
16.12 billion cubic meters of Nile waters, which irrigate approximately 2.95 million acres 
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of cultivable agricultural land annually.52 Holding onto its “prior appropriation” rights, 
and water allocation as per the 1959 bilateral treaty with Egypt, Sudan intends to expand 
its irrigation projects while opposed to any water allocation claims by the upstream states. 
3. Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania 
The British regarded the East African countries of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania 
as “century storage” for Egypt and Sudan, owing to their proximity to the equator, which 
ensured them a stable annual rainfall as well as lower evaporation rates. Rain-fed 
agriculture and pastoralism in the region protected the Rift Valley lakes from human 
encroachment for irrigation purposes, although local indigenous communities accessed 
the rivers and lakes for fisheries and transportation—activities that did not threaten the 
natural flow of the Nile.  
Uganda utilizes the Nile waters for hydroelectric power at Owen Falls based on a 
colonial-era accord of 1953, under which Egyptian technicians continue to control the 
flow of the White Nile at the dam. All three East African countries also practice lakeside 
agriculture around Lake Victoria. Moreover, fishing is an important economic activity in 
Lake Victoria with the Nile Perch alone earning over $250 million annually for the three 
East African states in foreign exchange. According to Okbazghi Yohannes,“. . . 350,000 
directly employed and 1.2 million indirectly employed Ugandan fishermen produce an 
average of 220,000 tonnes of fish annually. Likewise, Kenyan and Tanzanian fishermen 
together produce approximately 350,000 tonnes of fish per year.”53  
Since all three East African countries depend on agricultural commodity exports 
for foreign exchange, they are likely to look to Lake Victoria to provide water for 
irrigation and hydropower generation as their populations increase and ecological 
degradation worsens. This increasing demand for water for irrigation and power is  
 
                                                 
  52 Debay Tadesse, “The Nile: Is it a curse or a blessing” (Institute for Security Studies paper 174, 
Nov 2008), 14. 
 53 Okbazaghi Yohannes, Water Resources and Inter-riparian Relations in the Nile basin: The Search 
for an Integrative Discourse, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2008), 127. 
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occurring as Uganda contributes over 50 percent of Lake Victoria’s water, and Kenya and 
Tanzania contribute 30 and 18 percent of the Lake’s waters, respectively, to downstream 
countries’ benefit.54 
4. Ethiopia and Eritrea 
Ethiopia is hydrologically the wealthiest of the Nile basin countries, contributing 
85 percent of the Nile’s waters, yet it only utilizes one percent of its water resources for 
irrigation and hydropower generation. Ethiopia’s ambition is to utilize the Nile waters for 
domestic food production and transform the country into a major producer and exporter 
of hydroelectric power. Ethiopia has about 5.7 million hectares of potentially irrigable 
land and an untapped electricity generation capacity of 60 billion kWh per annum. A 
Growing food deficit, rising population, and worsening drought conditions, necessitate 
Ethiopia’s development of about 2.4 million hectares of its irrigable land and 103,680 
GWh per year of hydroelectric power potential in the Nile basin.55 
Eritrea’s annual water contribution to the Nile system through the Gash, Barka, 
and Setit rivers is estimated at 1.7 billion cubic meters. Eritrea has a cultivable area of 
about 1.6 million hectares, of which 187,000 hectares may be put under irrigation, and its 
rivers have a hydropower generation potential of about 16,890 Gwh.56 If Eritrea decides 
to harness its hydropower potential in the Gash River, this could trigger tension with the 
Sudan, which depends on the Gash river flow for irrigation in its eastern region. At the 
same time, Eritrea’s move would breach an existing treaty signed between Italy (on 
behalf of Eritrea) and Britain (on behalf of the Sudan) in 1925, which stipulates that 
Eritrea not undertake any works on the Gash river that would obstruct its flow. In return, 
Sudan is supposed to share the benefits from the cultivation in the Gash Delta by paying 
Eritrea 20 percent of the sale of crops. At some future point, Eritrea could decide to 
                                                 
  54 Okbazaghi Yohannes, Water Resources and Inter-riparian Relations in the Nile basin: The Search 
for an Integrative Discourse, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2008), 103. 
 55 Debay Tadesse, “The Nile: Is it a curse or a blessing” (Institute for Security Studies paper 174, Nov 
2008), 4. 
 56 Okbazaghi Yohannes, Water Resources and Inter-riparian Relations in the Nile basin: The Search 
for an Integrative Discourse, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2008), 94. 
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exploit the rivers in its territory due to periodic droughts and erratic rainfall that have led 
to persistent crop failures, livestock losses, water shortages, and a dependence on foreign 
food aid. The location of Eritrea in the Sahel rainfall zone leaves 90 percent of the 
country with an annual rainfall of about 450 mm, and high evaporation rates of between 
1700 and 2000 mm, occasioning water scarcity. The worsening food situation in Eritrea, 
brought about by the water situation, limits Eritrea’s food productivity to between 50 and 
60 percent of its food requirements even in years with good harvests. The food deficit 
situation has led the Eritrean government to construct microdams and diversion canals for 
irrigation in the Setit-Gash-Barka triangle—a move that could affect Sudanese-Eritrean 
relations. 
5. The Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, and Burundi 
The significance of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in the Nile Basin is 
its contribution of water thanks to precipitation in its tropical rainforest, and via the 
Semleki River which flows into Lake Albert – shared with Uganda – and provides up to 5 
bcm of water into the Nile annually.57 Fishing in Lake Albert is an economic activity that 
provides food for the local community, and income for education, consumer goods, 
healthcare, and taxes.  
Rwanda and Burundi contribute about 8 bcm annual water flow into Lake 
Victoria through the Kagera River.  The Kagera supports cultivation in both Rwanda and 
Burundi. The tropical rainforests in the Congo River basin are important for sustaining 
the regeneration of the Nile, and the pollution and contamination from these uppermost 
Nile states could result into the degradation of water quality downstream.58  
F. CONCLUSION 
 The Nile basin and its water resources are central to the survival of the riparian 
states, as they protect themselves against the vagaries of nature, enhance their food 
                                                 
  57 Okbazaghi Yohannes, Water Resources and Inter-riparian Relations in the Nile basin: The Search 
for an Integrative Discourse, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2008), 145. 
  58 Ibid., 147. 
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security, develop cash-generating crops, and develop energy for economic development. 
As the upper riparian states pursue the utilization of the Nile against the “acquired 
appropriative rights” of the downstream states, the likely result is overexploitation of the 
water resources, degradation of the water quality, and conflict following the depletion of 
natural resources. The uppermost riparian states of DRC, Rwanda, and Burundi, though 
not directly interested in the Nile, could pose a danger to the conservation and protection 
of the sources of the Nile, if not incorporated in a Nile water resource-sharing regime. 
The potential for Nile basin conflict or cooperation revolves around, first, the gap 
between water availability and the demand by individual countries for development 
projects.  Egypt’s growing need for more water to expand its irrigation projects, Sudan’s 
plan to increase its investment in irrigation and hydropower—with a water demand 
beyond its annual allocation under the 1959 treaty—and the upstream states’  water needs 
for irrigation as well mean that,  “. . . the annual water deficit in the Nile basin would 
probably exceed 50 billion cubic meters.”59 Second, the downstream countries depend 
heavily on the Nile water, yet their contribution to the flow is minimal. This brings to the 
fore the disparity between the contribution to and utilization of water among the riparian 
states. For instance, Egypt contributes nothing, but it depends on the Nile for 97 percent 
of its water supply, and actually consumes more than 80 percent of the Nile’s water. In 
contrast, Ethiopia contributes 85 percent of the Nile flow and uses none of it for 
irrigation. Nor do other upstream states.60 The dilemma generated by these 
characteristics puts national sovereignty against international water law, since countries 
in a shared water basin cannot withdraw water, dam a river, or emit pollution, without 
affecting other riparian countries. Similarly, it is only through coordinated action that 
water development can be undertaken efficiently in a shared basin. 
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III. HISTORY OF CONTROL OVER THE NILE, THE WATER 
AGREEMENTS AND THEIR EFFECT ON INTERSTATE 
RELATIONS 
A. THE NILE CONTROL DURING THE PRE-COLONIAL PERIOD 
 In the 4th century B.C., the Greek historian Herodotus described “Egypt as a gift 
of the Nile”61, an observation that has remained true to this day since Egypt’s prosperity 
and existence is dependent on the Nile flow. Because of this dependence, Egypt 
embarked on a strategy to develop hegemony over the Nile millennia ago. As ancient 
Egyptians realized, the Emperor of Ethiopia could shut off the life-giving waters. Egypt’s 
strategy thus entailed efforts to prevent upstream economic development along the banks 
of the Nile that could either divert the flow of the water, or decrease it. Egypt 
subsequently sought to expand its influence over the sources of the Nile. 
In the period 1314–1344, Egyptian persecution of the Copts of Egypt and 
destruction of churches attracted a response from the monarch of Ethiopia who threatened 
to carry out reprisals against Muslims in his territory, and starve the people of Egypt by 
diverting Nile waters. Between 1769 and 1849, Egypt invaded the Sudan in an effort to 
control the entire Nile. This conquest was a stepping-stone to the occupation of the 
western frontiers of Ethiopia from 1834 to 1875 and subsequent invasion of Ethiopia. 
Egypt’s motive was to,“. . . make the Nile an Egyptian river by annexing to Egypt all the 
geographical areas of the basin,”62 based on the analysis that Ethiopia’s disciplined 
administration and army, and its friendship with European powers, could be a danger for 
Egypt. It became imperative for Egypt, “either to take over Ethiopia and Islamize it, or 
retain it in anarchy and misery”63 − a paranoia that was to come into conflict with the 
nationalism of the upstream states. Egypt undertook further military raids in Ethiopia  
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from 1875 and, although unsuccessful, sustained them until 1882, when the British 
occupied Egypt and made Egypt’s interests their own, claiming that he who controls the 
Nile controls Egypt. 
B. THE TREATY PROVISIONS 
The 1929 treaty between Egypt and Britain (as the colonial power in the region) 
solely worked to the benefit of Egypt—Sudan only getting a water allotment of 4 billion 
cubic meters per year for the Gezira irrigation scheme. The treaty stipulated that no 
works that would alter the flow of the Nile were to be constructed on the Nile, its 
tributaries, or equatorial lakes without Egypt’s consent. In essence, the treaty guaranteed 
Egypt’s political stability, water security, and ability to supply the global market with 
cotton, by putting the entire Nile basin at Egypt’s disposal. The treaty also relieved 
Britain’s concern over water for the Gezira irrigation scheme in Sudan, and gave veto 
powers to Egypt over any Nile-related water projects in upstream states. The 1929 treaty 
provided Egypt with acquired rights which the 1959 Egypt-Sudan bilateral treaty later 
drew on. 
Today’s structural scarcity of water imposed by Egypt on the upper riparian states 
is evident in the 1959 Full Utilization of the Nile Waters Agreement between Egypt and 
the Sudan according to which, the Sudan and Egypt allocated themselves 18.5 milliards 
and 55.5 milliards of the Nile’s annual average water yield of 84 milliards 
(respectively).64 While disregarding the upper riparian states in this water allocation, 
Egypt and Sudan established a Technical Commission to undertake any Nile water 
negotiations with any riparian state outside the boundaries of the two republics. While 
this agreement united Egypt and the Sudan against other riparian states in the matter of 
Nile water control, it revealed Egypt’s dependence on the Nile, especially after a special 
provision had to be made for a water loan from the Sudan to enable Egypt to proceed  
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with agricultural expansion. The 1959 Nile water agreement between Sudan and Egypt 
did not put an end to the dispute over rights to the Nile waters, and strong tensions 
remain.  
C. INTERSTATE RELATIONS TO DATE 
The limitations of the 1929 and the 1959 Nile water treaties continue to 
negatively affect interstate relations among the Nile basin countries. On the one hand, 
Egypt maintains its 1973 geopolitical definition of water resources and willingness to 
employ military power to defend its water security, and advances a legal argument in 
defense of the status quo by maintaining that the colonial-era treaties are sacrosanct. 
Further, Egypt uses economic and diplomatic pressure to deny upstream states access to 
international financial and technical resources, and engages in destabilization campaigns 
in upstream states by supporting insurgencies. On the other hand, the upstream states 
have voiced concern over the legitimacy of the colonial-era agreements, arguing that 
Egypt has been able to industrialize by using Nile water to generate electricity and 
undertake irrigation while preventing similar usage by the upstream countries through 
military threat and intimidation. Egypt’s current irrigation projects—North Sinai 
Development and the Southern Valley projects—due to be completed by 2017, and which 
are expected to increase Egypt’s cultivable land from 3.4 million hectares to 4.6 million 
hectares65, are seen by the upstream states as proof of Egypt’s determination to continue 
overexploiting the Nile waters. 
It is worth noting, however, that Egypt and Sudan have never really realized 
political and economic unity in the exploitation of the Nile. Past agreements, like the 
1959 bilateral treaty, were imposed by Egypt, whose justification for the low water 
allocation to Sudan was that it had alternative water resource of rainfall that enabled rain-
fed agriculture as opposed to Egypt’s total dependence on the Nile for its water needs.  
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Sudan’s defeated argument had been that the availability of high potential agricultural 
land should be the criterion for Nile water allocation, based on which it claimed 44 
billion cubic meters allocation.66  
Both countries acted in concert in 1976 to develop the Jonglei Canal scheme with 
the purpose of increasing the White Nile flow with a bypass of the Sudd swamp. 
However, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) disrupted the project in 1983 
arguing that canalization would have negative ecological ramifications on the climate, 
vegetation, and the hydrologic regime of the region, with an adverse social impact on the 
livelihood of the indigenous communities.67  
The 1959 Egypt-Sudan bilateral treaty is an evident commitment by both 
countries to act together to counter claims for water allocation by other riparian states. 
Due to its total dependence on the Nile, Egypt continues to try to form a federation with 
Sudan, and even Libya and Syria, on the grounds of a shared economic, strategic, and 
pan-Arab ideology. The attempt to realize a federation between Sudan and Egypt is, 
however, not feasible with the potential split of north and south Sudan as a consequence 
of the 2011 referendum mandated by the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The 
anticipated split will compound the regional Nile water dispute, with south Sudan 
unlikely to respect the existing water treaty.68 
1. Contest Over Legality of Treaties 
Egypt claims that the British-Egyptian water treaty of 1929, supported by the 
1889 British protocols with the Congo Free State (today’s Democratic Republic of 
Congo), and agreements with Italy and Ethiopia in 1902, affirm its appropriative rights to 
the Nile waters. Egypt further argues that under the principles of uti possidetis69 and state 
succession, former British colonies are obliged to uphold all international obligations 
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assumed by the colonial power prior to independence.70 It is against this claim that the 
former East African colonies—Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania—denounce the 1929 treaty 
arguing that African independence was a repudiation of colonialism, including all its 
legacies. In 1962, for example, then-Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere announced, “the 
provisions of the 1929 agreement, purporting to apply to the countries under British 
Administration, are not binding to Tanganyika.”71 Questioning the legality of the treaties 
and the morality of the present inequitable distribution of the Nile waters, Tanzania’s 
water resources Minister, Edward Lowassa, in 2004 said, “We do not recognize what 
happened in the past. We want equitable and reasonable use of the Nile waters for mutual 
benefits in all the riparian states.”72 In addition, then-Kenyan Vice President Moody 
Awori said, “The Nile is the most important single asset that is shared by all the ten 
countries that lie within its basin. As such, the Nile River is not the property of any one 
state.”73  
Egypt backs up its rights to the Nile waters based on the existing treaties by 
advancing a moral claim. It argues that there is no significant rainfall in its territory and 
so it does not have any other option by which to survive, and that the upstream states 
have long survived without the use of the Nile waters and, as such, can live in this same 
way to the future.74 Egypt’s argument that the upstream states have—indeed—survived 
without the Nile water, seems to support Tony Allen’s proposition that “virtual water” 
has helped prevent conflict over water in the Middle East and North Africa. However, 
virtual water, defined as water contained in imported food,75 has mostly been received by 
the Nile upstream states in the form of food aid from the international community. Food 
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aid dependency in some upstream states is a direct consequence of their lack of economic 
ability to purchase food. Ironically, without agriculture, they cannot generate the capital 
required. 
The upstream states, however, oppose Egypt’s argument, noting that the principle 
of “equitable shares” in a shared international river is defined in the Helsinki Accords, 
and its application is evident in other parts of the world, such as China and India. As 
Ethiopia puts it, “It was the imperialist British . . . who legally established Egypt’s 
“historic rights,” but they were never recognized by the independent African states. It is 
an unjust principle, the legacy of foreign intervention, long dead, like Emperor Menelik 
and British colonialism.”76 
2. Militant Rhetoric 
The rhetorical militancy from the upstream countries against Egypt’s hegemony 
over the Nile’s water is evident in the denunciation of the 1929 treaty by a former 
Kenyan minister for culture and sports, Alicen Chelaite, during a land policy and 
management conference in 2005 at which she characterized the treaty as: 
repressive, obsolete, and unrealistic . . . . It is a shame that almost all 
catchment areas of Lake Victoria are managed and sustained by 
governments and citizens of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, yet they are 
barred by the treaty from using its waters for irrigation purposes, a move 
that has locked out a huge agricultural potential in the region. Downstream 
Egyptians who have nothing to contribute in managing the lake’s 
catchment are busy tapping River Nile waters for commercial activities.77 
3. Military Threats and Intimidation 
Tanzania’s announcement that it would utilize Lake Victoria’s water for irrigation 
in 2004 prompted Egypt’s threat of airstrikes, as did Sudan’s 1995 announcement of a 
plan for more water projects and a suggestion it might review the 1959 agreement. To 
that Egypt’s current president, Hosni Mubarak responded, “Any step to this end will 
                                                 
 76 Haggai Erlich, The Cross and the River: Ethiopia, Egypt, and the Nile (London: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2002), 7. 
  77 Okbazghi Yohannes, Water Resources and Inter-riparian Relations in the Nile Basin: The Search 
for an Intergrative Discourse (Albany: State University of New York, 2008), 114–115. 
 35
force us into confrontation to defend our rights and life. Our response will be beyond 
anything they can imagine.”78 Egypt’s concern about Tanzania’s unilateral decision to 
draw Nile water is more about the precedent being set than the quantity of water it might 
take, since Kenya too has plans to use Lake Victoria waters to bolster its country’s food 
security. 
Egypt’s threat is not dissimilar from the United States’ Carter Doctrine of 1980, 
which was a response to the Soviet Union invasion / occupation of Afghanistan. The 
United States viewed the Soviet occupation as a move to establish hegemony in the 
region, which would then constitute a threat to transit of Middle East oil. This situation 
represented a Cold War-era clash between the Soviet Union’s ability to project military 
power, and the United States’ dependence on Middle East.79 President Carter therefore 
declared that, “an attempt by any outside force [Soviet Union] to gain control of the 
Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United 
States of America and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including 
military force.”80 This same motivation was again, used to secure oil supplies from Saudi 
Arabia when Ronald Reagan, Jimmy Carter’s successor, declared in 1981 that the United 
States would intervene to protect Saudi Arabia from the destabilizing threat of the Iran – 
Iraq war.81 According to Bruce R. Kuniholm, since World War II the United States had 
proclaimed the Persian Gulf [and Arabian Peninsula] as one of its national interests.  
These scenarios suggest that powerful states do threaten and intimidate other 
states all the time to safeguard their national interests. 
                                                 
  78 Michael T. Klare, Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict (Henry Holt & 
Company: New York, 2001), 158. 
  79 Melvyn P Leffler, “From the Truman Doctrine to the Carter Doctrine: Lessons and Dilemmas of 
the Cold War” (Diplomatic History, Vol 7 No 4, 1983), 245–266 http://dx.doi.org/10.111/j.1467 - 
7709.1983.tb00394.x  (accessed Feb 06, 2010), 261. 
  80 Bruce R. Kuniholm, “The Carter Doctrine, the Reagan Corollary, and Prospects for United States 
Policy in Southwest Asia” (International Journal, Vol 41, No 2, Southwest Asia Spring 1986), 342–361 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/402202373  (accessed Feb 09, 2010), 343. 
  81 Ibid., 345–346. 
 36
4. Egypt’s Diplomatic and Economic Pressure 
Other than the threat of force, Egypt has also relied on diplomacy and economic 
pressure to maintain its hegemony over the Nile. For instance, Egypt blocked financial 
approval of Ethiopia’s loan for irrigation and hydroelectric projects from the African 
Development Bank in the 1970s.82 Other international donors, “. . . such as the World 
Bank, are reluctant to advance funds [to upstream states] for major river projects that will 
upset Egypt, a key Arab ally of the U.S. in the Middle East.”83 Moreover, Egypt 
continues to prevent project funding to upstream states by world financial institutions and 
donor countries, particularly in the Arab-speaking world. As Okbazghi notes:  
Egypt has successfully denied upstream states access to donor agencies 
and countries. Egypt’s pivotal role in Middle East politics, its dependence 
on American patronage, and the support it gets from oil-rich Arab states 
have proved effective weapons for quashing demands from upstream 
states for international help to develop their water resources.84 
Since the overthrow of the communist Mengistu regime in 1991 and its conflict 
with Eritrea, Ethiopia has focused on water distribution, irrigation, and hydroelectric 
projects as national priorities. Consequently, it has increasingly opposed the water use of 
neighboring Egypt, claiming the present allocation − regulated by a 1959 agreement—is 
extremely unfair and is too one-sided in favor of Egypt and Sudan. Ethiopia threatens the 
unilateral exercise of sovereignty over its Nile water, or a military confrontation with 
Egypt.85  
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5. Competitive Exploitation of the Nile 
In the context of the 1959 Egypt-Sudan Nile treaty—and its determination to 
compete with the downstream states over utilization of the Nile waters—Ethiopia sought 
assistance from the United States Bureau of Reclamation to develop a master plan for 
irrigation and hydroelectric projects on the Blue Nile. The study proposed construction of 
four major dams on the Blue Nile with a combined storage capacity of 51 billion cubic 
meters, and twenty-nine irrigation and hydroelectric projects.86 Ethiopia was unable to 
undertake these projects due to a lack of means. But it is unlikely that Egypt would have 
tolerated a water reduction of such quantity. 
Egypt, for its part, has long asserted aggressive control over Nile water, defining 
access to the Nile waters as a national security issue over which it is prepared to go to 
war. Egypt’s dependency on the Nile motivated its efforts to create the capacity to trap 
and store water, including the construction of the Aswan High Dam with a storage 
capacity of 164 billion cubic meters – an equivalent of two years flow of the Nile. 
Despite these attempts, however, Egypt has become increasingly vulnerable on the water 
issue owing to environmental effects that have reduced the available water flowing to 
Egypt via the Nile, making Egypt increasingly dependent upon and enmeshed in the 
politics and interstate dynamics in the region. 
This growing vulnerability is likely to become a major source of political tension 
in the Nile basin. Since Egypt retains an aggressive military stance in relation to water, 
Ethiopia’s domestic development efforts (such as growing attempts to dam the Blue Nile) 
and Uganda’s need to undertake hydroelectric projects, for instance, are likely to result in 
increasing regional tensions.87 Egypt has also historically been wary of splitting up 
Sudan for fear that it will affect its share of the Nile waters, which it considers its 
lifeline.88  
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6. Political Instability and Support for Insurgencies 
Although political instability in most upstream states has helped maintain the 
status quo regarding the Nile water dispute, the end of these conflicts—especially the 
Ethiopian-Eritrean dispute and Sudan’s North-South conflict—may be an indicator that 
the upstream states now have room to pursue what they consider to be their critical 
national interests. Due to the limitations of the Nile treaties, interstate relations among the 
Nile basin countries, on some occasions have been marked by proxy wars. Klare aptly 
summarizes Egypt’s interference in the upstream states:  
Apparently sensing advantage in this state of affairs [conflicts in the 
upstream states], Egypt sought to perpetuate its privileged position on the 
Nile by aiding anti-government forces in neighboring countries. This 
entailed support for Somali irredentists in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, 
and the rebel Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) in southern 
Sudan.89  
Egypt’s involvement in the conflict between Somali and Ethiopia, for example, is 
motivated by its policy to prevent upstream use of the waters of the Blue Nile by 
engaging Somalia in a war against Ethiopia, which keeps Ethiopia’s focus on protecting 
its territorial integrity, diverting its scarce resources from development to security and 
defense. In May 1978, the Kenyan Air Force forced Egyptian warplanes carrying 
weapons for the Somali army to land at Nairobi International Airport.90 Egypt’s foreign 
policy of destabilization is also evident in its encouragement of Ethiopian Muslims to 
secede, and in its provision of military training to Eritreans beginning in 1958, “. . . to 
undermine Haile Selassie’s Government [Ethiopia] and urging Eritreans to take arms and 
to struggle for their independence.”91 
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7. Conflicting Water Laws 
The contentious relations among the Nile basin countries over the existing water 
agreements is defined by Egypt’s position of holding onto the international law principle 
of absolute territorial integrity or the principle of prior appropriation (“acquired rights”) 
while the upstream countries hold onto the principle of absolute territorial sovereignty 
(“natural rights”).  The principle of “absolute territorial integrity” provides for the 
downstream states to accuse or censure any of the upstream state(s) for illegally taking 
measures disadvantageous to the former’s interests. The “prior appropriation” principle 
protects the rights of use for the country that puts the water into use first, while the 
principle of “absolute territorial sovereignty” regards water bodies as an integral part of a 
state’s national territory.92  
These conflicting positions are further manifested in the current stalemate in the 
Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) cooperative framework. Egypt and Sudan continue to object 
to upstream states’ attempts to secure equitable allocation of the Nile waters by 
advancing Article 4 of the NBI. According to Article 4, “Nile basin states agree in a spirit 
of cooperation, not to significantly affect the water security of any other Nile basin state.” 
Egypt and Sudan, on the other hand, want it amended to reflect their historic rights, “Nile 
basin states agree, in a spirit of cooperation, not to adversely affect the water security and 
current uses and rights of any other Nile basin States.”93 It is Egypt’s and Sudan’s desire 
that a clause guaranteeing their water security is inserted to the NBI Article, which would 
mean their continued intensive and extensive use of the Nile water resource. In contrast, 
the upstream states object to Egypt’s demand since, “To accept Egypt’s historic rights [is] 
to admit to the primacy of Egypt’s future needs.”94 
The Nile Basin Initiative is an effort to thwart states taking a state-centric view of 
the Nile. Funded by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), United Nations 
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Environmental Program (UNEP), and member Countries – Burundi, Demographic 
Republic of Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda—it 
aims to unite all the riparian countries in a shared vision to pursue sustainable 
development and management of the Nile waters.95 Although this vision recognizes that 
unilateral utilization of the water is unsustainable as well as conflict-inducing, Egypt and 
Sudan continue grand agricultural extension and industrial expansion plans.96 
8. Is There a Possible Compromise? 
Recently, Egypt has not only pursued a policy of economic engagement with the 
source countries of the water to promote alternative sources of water (we can call this the 
carrot), but it has also resorted to diplomatic pressure and thinly concealed threats to 
defend its priority veto status over the use of Nile waters (the stick). Egypt’s softened 
stance is evident in its response to an African Development Bank (ADB) loan notification 
of $50 million to Ethiopia in 2003 for the Koga hydroelectric and irrigation project. 
Egypt’s conciliatory position is due in part to an international shift in attitude as signaled 
by a World Bank water resource adviser’s opinion, “There is no precedent for a country 
developing without harnessing its rivers and utilizing its water resources.”97 
Consequently, it appears Egypt would rather monitor and control Ethiopia’s water 
resources development through cooperation rather than by seeming offensive. Another 
motivating factor for Egyptian moderation is Ethiopia’s plan to undertake micro-dam 
projects that would not only compromise Egyptian water security, but would also be 
immune to Egyptian military targeting due to their numbers and size. 
To date, interstate relations among the Nile basin states have been marked by 
rising tension characterized by mistrust, militant rhetoric, threats to undertake unilateral 
projects, military threats and intimidation, and proxy wars and support of insurgencies.  
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The overexploitation of the Nile by Egypt, which has been challenged by the upstream 
states coupled with Egypt’s ongoing diplomatic and economic pressure help define 
interstate relations in the Nile basin.  
D. THE EFFECT OF THE LIMITATIONS IN THE WATER AGREEMENTS 
ON DEVELOPMENT IN UPSTREAM COUNTRIES—ETHIOPIA, 
KENYA, AND TANZANIA 
The effect of the Nile water treaties on development in the upstream states creates 
a condition of “poverty in the midst of biotic plenty and thirst in the midst of hydrological 
abundance,”98 especially in Ethiopia and Kenya. In part, due to the Nile treaties’ 
limitations, Ethiopia utilizes only 1 percent of its surface water resources for 
hydroelectric power and irrigation purposes, enabling it to irrigate only 160,000 hectares 
of land and generate only 2 percent of its 60 billion kWh hydropower potential 
annually.99 
Ethiopia’s vision of developing hydroelectricity and irrigation is evident in its 
1958 master plan for four major dams on the Blue Nile and 29 other projects on 
tributaries in the basin. The anticipated potential power generation in these projects 
would have far exceeded what “Ethiopia could use in this century or the next, but could 
be of immense value to its neighbors . . . by the construction of an integrated grid.”100 
However, Ethiopia could not proceed with these projects because of their effect on the 
natural flow of the Nile and, of course, because of their effect on irrigation in Egypt and 
the Sudan. The limitations of the treaties have left Ethiopia over- dependent on rain-fed 
agriculture which is vulnerable to dry spells of delayed or interrupted rain and drought, 
leaving Ethiopia in a chronic situation of food insecurity, and therefore a continuous 
recipient of international food aid donations. 
Blaming Ethiopia’s underdevelopment on Egypt’s monopoly of the Nile, 
Ethiopia’s minister for trade and industry, Girma Birru, in 2003 said that Ethiopia was 
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unable to harness its natural wealth to alleviate poverty and promote growth since, 
“Egypt has been pressuring international institutions to desist from assisting Ethiopia in 
carrying out development projects in the Nile basin. It has used its influence to persuade 
the Arab world not to provide Ethiopia with any loans or grants for Nile water 
development.”101 
In Kenya, apart from cases of food insecurity due to shortfalls in precipitation, 
only 10 percent of Kenyans can access electricity, while 98 percent of Egyptians have 
access to electricity generated by the Nile. Kenya contributes 18 percent of Lake 
Victoria’s waters that feed into the Nile, while Uganda contributes 30 percent and 
Tanzania 50 percent. Kenya’s position is reflected in a 2002 statement by Raila Odinga 
(then a presidential candidate), “[The 1929 treaty] was signed on behalf of governments 
that were not in existence . . . this is an unfair agreement that we should negotiate afresh. 
If you want to use that water for food production, why should you be prevented from 
doing so, and you are conserving it for Egypt to go and use it for production, we think it 
is not fair.”102 
In Tanzania, agriculture accounts for 50 percent of the country’s GDP, and 
employs two-thirds of the population. With potential irrigable land of 94.3 million 
hectares, Tanzania had only 190,000 hectares under irrigation by 1997, yet it contributes 
50 percent of the Lake Victoria waters to the White Nile.103 
E. CONCLUSION 
The unresolved water dispute about use of the Nile water continues to slow 
economic development in the Nile basin. It is only by recognizing the primacy of factor 
endowments for economic development that the Nile basin countries can overcome the 
national interests of sovereign state in favor of multinational rights in owning and 
controlling transnational river basins. A revisit of the 1920-Century Storage Scheme, 
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proposed by Murdoch Macdonald to realize the establishment of a series of dams at 
suitable confluences in upstream states104, would reduce water loss by evaporation, 
provide storage for the irrigation needs of downstream states, as well as generate 
electricity at points with the greatest potential. Tanzania and Uganda are identified as 
countries with a huge hydroelectric potential on the White Nile, thanks to a drop in the 
river elevation of about half a mile. Lake Tana, source of the Blue Nile, is at an elevation 
of about 1.1 mile above sea level and the elevation drops to less than one-third of a mile 
above sea level at Khartoum. This drop in elevation creates high potential for hydropower 
generation in Ethiopia.105  
A compromise over the situation would facilitate means to avert water loss 
through evaporation if water was stored in upstream states, and hydropower was 
developed to benefit the whole basin. Upstream countries that have this potential, like 
Ethiopia and Uganda, could help provide this energy to downstream states, which could 
then expand their agricultural production and provide foreign exchange to upstream 
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IV. EGYPTIAN HEGEMONY AND PAST ATTEMPTS TOWARDS 
A COOPERATIVE FRAMEWORK 
A. WHY HAS EGYPT MANAGED TO MAINTAIN HEGEMONY OVER 
THE NILE? 
Egypt’s determination to monopolize utilization of the Nile’s water revolves 
around its historic claim of prior appropriation and total dependence on the Nile given 
that it is 98 percent desert. Egypt’s hegemony has resulted from both its military and 
economic strength, and also thanks to the lack of capital, as well as instability in the 
upstream states. To the extent that upstream states remain wracked by conflicts and 
underdevelopment, Egypt will maintain its hegemony over the Nile. This trend has 
continued since the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, which then attracted British 
colonization at the source of the Nile. All subsequent Nile treaties sought to preserve the 
British position in Egypt, and secure the Suez Canal, as well as the sea route to India. 
Until today, Egypt maintains that “Cairo controls the Suez and the Nile waters control 
Cairo,”106 and so, therefore, its determination to control the Nile. 
Sharing the same goal of securing their water supplies in the face of increasing 
pressure for equitable distribution by the upstream states, and given their geopolitical 
alignmnet in the Nile basin, Egypt and Sudan maintain a partial coalition. Neither of 
these two countries contributes much to the flow of the Nile—Egypt’s contribution is 
zero and Sudan’s minimal107—yet their dependence on the Nile is 97 per cent and 77 per 
cent respectively.108 Both countries perceive mutual advantages in this coalition, with 
Egypt assisting Sudan by providing for poor households in Sudan, thus addressing the 
international community’s goal of poverty alleviation. Sudan, for its part, views Egypt’s 
political, economic, and military position as a deterrent to upstream states, thus assuring  
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continued water supplies. It is no wonder that Sudan, rather than take an adversarial view, 
has always chosen to remain silent on the Nile water issue and on regional conflicts in the 
Nile basin countries where Egypt is involved. 
Egypt’s hegemony over the use of the Nile is evident in its military strength in the 
region. Egypt developed a strong military to be able to engage in the Israeli-Arab 
conflict, and after the Camp David accord in 1979, developed friendly relations with the 
West. That has made it a big recipient of both financial and military aid. Debay Tadesse, 
for instance, reports that Egypt receives $2 billion in financial aid per year from the 
United States, and in 2001 received $400 million worth of arms from the Bush 
administration. This arms deal saw Egypt acquire highly accurate surface-to-surface 
missiles, satellite-guided anti-ship missiles, F-16 fighter planes, M1A1 Abrams tanks, 
and Patriot anti-missile systems, among other state of the art American weaponry.109 In 
1995, of a total expenditure of $6 billion on military equipment by the Nile basin 
countries, Egypt’s portion was $4 billion.110 It is this massive military power which 
Egypt has continued to use to threaten and intimidate other riparian states. 
As an ally of the West, Egypt is able to access development funds from world 
lending bodies—e.g., the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank – that are 
unwilling to support any projects in the upstream states that might disrupt the Nile flow 
to Egypt and cause instability. The West’s interest in Egypt is not only because of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, but also thanks to its geopolitical importance in terms of the Suez 
Canal, especially after the 1956 Suez Crisis. The crisis followed the United States 
withdrawal of its pledge to fund construction of Egypt’s Aswan High Dam when the 
latter refused to join the United States-sponsored Baghdad Pact that aimed to prevent the 
Soviet expansion into the Middle East. Instead, Egypt sought Soviet support to crush 
Israel. The United States’ move prompted Egypt to nationalize the canal in order to raise 
revenue to construct the dam.111 
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The industrialized countries’ interest in Egypt during the Cold War period 
involved each superpower trying to win Egypt to its side by providing economic and 
military grants.112 As a result of Egypt’s political and economic leverage with the World 
Bank and IMF, the upstream states never received the capital to develop irrigation and 
hydropower projects on the Nile that could have helped alleviate poverty and improve 
their food security. In the past, Egypt blocked World Bank financial aid to Ethiopia for 
the development of the Finchaa hydropower project, and in the early 1990s it prevented 
Ethiopia’s loan application from the African Development Bank for water projects that 
Egypt feared would reduce the Nile’s flow.113   
However, while Egypt is able to undertake unilateral water projects due to 
external aid, it is also hugely indebted to its international creditors. For example, despite 
being the largest recipient of United States aid in Africa, it had a $31 billion external debt 
in 1996. This debt factor and reliance on external aid leaves Egypt vulnerable to the 
international community, which could use its economic advantage to compel Egypt into 
cooperation—a “debt-for-cooperation” swap.114  
What is uncertain is whether Egyptian professionals holding senior positions in 
world institutions in the past have defended Egyptian interests regarding the Nile water 
control. Influence at key institutions could have enhanced Egypt’s defiant position on the 
Nile water-sharing agreements. Senior Egyptian personalities who have held key 
positions in world institutions include the former United Nations Secretary-General, a 
former vice president of the World Bank, and a former head of the United Nations 
Environmental Program. Egypt’s position in respect to the Nile has therefore continued to 
revolve around natural, acquired, and historical rights governed by the hydro-political 
doctrines of “prior use”, “primary need”, and “acquired rights”.115 
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To enhance and protect its monopoly over the Nile, Egypt entered into close 
political and economic relations with the oil-rich Arab countries of the Middle East in 
2004.116 Through this integration, Egypt is at the center of electricity for nine Arab 
countries. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) Fund for 
International Development pledged an easy-term loan to fund increased capacity for 
hydropower generation at the North Cairo Electricity Grid, thanks to what they refer to as 
its centrality that reduces transmission costs, close proximity to fuel sources, and ample 
water for cooling. Yet, none of these Arab countries contributes water to the Nile’s flow. 
But due to Egypt’s influence in the Arab world, it is able to prevent the upstream states 
from receiving any aid or loans from the Arab nations.  
Political instability in the upstream states has also helped to perpetuate Egyptian 
hegemony over the Nile’s use. From Ethiopia’s unresolved border dispute with Eritrea 
and insurgencies in her southern regions and Somalia’s instability to ethnic conflicts in 
the Great Lakes region, Egypt has not faced any political and economic challenge from 
among the Nile basin countries. It has also exploited these instabilities by reinforcing 
them through the supply of arms to Somalia and to Eritrea against Ethiopia.117 Egypt also 
secured the oil-rich Arab countries’ support for the Eritrean fighters, and financed the 
establishment of an Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) office in Cairo as early as 1962.  
Egypt’s covert destabilization policy in the unstable Horn of Africa grew out of President 
Anwar Sadat’s warning that, “Any action [from the upstream states] that would endanger 
the waters of the Nile will be faced with a firm reaction on the part of Egypt, even if that 
action should lead to war.”118 Instability in the Nile basin also includes the civil war 
between North and South Sudan, the war in Darfur, and Sudan’s periodic clashes with 
neighboring Chad. To illustrate further the absence of any formidable challenge to 
Egypt’s control over the Nile, Ethiopia continues to experience insurgent activities from 
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the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), 
which are seeking independence or greater autonomy. Apart from Eritrea’s border dispute 
with Ethiopia and their proxy war in Somalia, Eritrea has a border dispute with Djibouti 
as well. 
The status quo when it comes to Nile basin water allocation could also be 
explained by Tony Allen’s “virtual water” argument. He contends that, “more water 
flows into the countries of the Middle East and North Africa as virtual water each year 
than flows down the Nile for Egypt’s agriculture.”119 Although this virtual water is in the 
form of emergency food aid, it has reduced the tension that would otherwise have been 
created between Egypt and the upstream states had they embarked on unilateral irrigation 
projects to combat their chronic food insecurity. To avert potential starvation in 2004, for 
instance, Kenya appealed for 15,600 tons of food aid from the international community 
and, in 2006 again, asked for $263 million in emergency donor aid for food.120 Ethiopia 
remains chronically food insecure, with six-month emergency food aid needed for 6.2 
million people in 2009 and costing $285 million.121 Again, this is despite the fact that 
Ethiopia is the source of about 85 percent of the Nile water.   
The absence of a serious challenge to Egypt’s monopoly over the Nile waters has 
enabled it to continue to deploy human, material, and technological resources and put in 
place legal and institutional frameworks that could best be described as “zero sum.” 
Against the arguments of the upstream states that the 1929 Nile water agreement is an 
outdated colonial relic because foreign rulers negotiated it without regard for these 
countries’ best interests, Egypt maintains that this agreement together with the 1959 
bilateral treaty with Sudan, gives it legally valid water rights. This claim has formed a 
benchmark in Egypt’s foreign policy to safeguard the uninterrupted flow of the Nile. The 
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upstream states, for their part, have not yet adopted the weak-nation strategy of collective 
action and internationalization of these contentious issues. 
B. ATTEMPTS TOWARDS COOPERATIVE FRAMEWORK 
1. Organization for the Management and Development of Kagera River 
Basin 
 At independence in 1960, Tanzania’s first president, Julius Nyerere, proclaimed 
that Tanzania did not recognize the colonial-era Nile water treaties, and to demonstrate 
his determination to harness the Nile waters, he initiated the Rusumu Agreement in 1977, 
which brought together Tanzania, Burundi, and Rwanda under the Organization for the 
Management and Development of the Kagera River Basin. Uganda joined later in 
1981.122 The Kagera River is Lake Victoria’s single largest source of inflow. Initially 
established in 1969 as the Kagera Organization, its objective was to organize the 
management and development of the Kagera River basin for hydroelectric power 
generation and promote regional development in agriculture, transportation, and 
communication. However, political instability, ideological differences, and the failure by 
the member states to meet their financial pledges marred the project, thus postponing any 
possibility of success. Although the organization did not achieve its objective, it, 
combined with Ethiopia’s reassertion of its rights to the Nile waters in the same year, 
posed a wake-up call for Egypt. In 1980, Ethiopia claimed that Egypt planned to divert 
the Nile illegally to Sinai, a charge that catalyzed more declarations by the upstream 
states. 
2. The Badolite Declaration 
In 1981, in another attempt to create a cooperative framework that would break 
Egypt’s hegemony, Uganda, Zaire (now DRC), and Sudan issued the Badolite 
Declaration, calling for creation of an agency to coordinate and develop the Nile 
                                                 
  122 Robert O. Collins, “The Waters of the Nile: Hydro Politics and the Jonglei Canal, 1900 – 1988” 
(Princeton: Markus Weiner Publishers, 1996), 290. 
 51
basin.123 Egypt denounced the declaration and sought to promote the Permanent Joint 
Technical Commission (PJTC), established in 1959 between Egypt and Sudan to lead 
regional development in interstate projects. Egypt’s proposal sought to play down the 
centrality of water supply among the upstream states, while playing up the common 
benefits to be realized from integrated development throughout the basin in fields that 
had little to do with water or water supply, such as, tourism, trade, transport and 
communication, mineral exploitation and exploration, etc. The upstream states saw the 
PJTC as Egypt’s move to promote its interests in the Nile by bringing all the co-riparian 
states under its influence.  This led to the collapse of the declaration. 
3. The Hydro-Meteorological Survey of the Equatorial Lakes 
(HYDROMET) 
Led by Egypt, the Nile basin countries of Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and Sudan, 
launched the Hydromet project in 1967, with the assistance of the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) to 
evaluate/survey the catchments and water balance of Lakes Victoria, Kyoga, and Albert, 
as well as the flow of the Nile. The collected data was meant to assist the riparian 
countries in water conservation planning, socio-economic development, and provide 
groundwork for intergovernmental cooperation for storage, regulation, and use of the 
Nile. Rwanda, DRC, and Burundi later joined the organization, while Ethiopia only 
joined as an observer.124 Owing to Egyptian dominance of the Hydromet initiative, 
however, the upstream states remained suspicious of the motives behind the project, 
viewing it as an Egypto-Sudanese scheme to tap into the water data for their planning 
purposes, as neither country’s territory fell within the survey area. As Arthur M. Ortegon 
observes, Egypt’s scheme was to promote development of “alternative water resources 
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for the upstream states as the key to a cooperative framework.”125 Egypt offered to assist 
the upstream states in developing the technology and processes to exploit these 
alternatives.  The project lasted until 1992, when the Technical Cooperation Commission 
for the Promotion and Development of the Nile (TECCONILE) succeeded it. 
4. The Technical Cooperation Commission for the Promotion and 
Development of the Nile (TECCONILE) 
TECCONILE came into operation in 1993 motivated by the need for inter-state    
cooperation in the use of the Nile water resources in the hopes of thwarting the conflict 
between downstream and upstream states. The member countries of TECCONILE were 
Egypt, Sudan, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, and DRC, while Kenya, Burundi, Ethiopia, 
and Eritrea were observers. The organization identified its short-term objectives as the 
development of infrastructure, capacity building and management of water resources, and 
formulation of national master plans and their integration into a Nile Basin Action Plan. 
Its long-term objectives were the development of integrated and sustainable basin-wide 
cooperation and the determination of equitable sharing of its waters.126  
The upstream states’ support for TECCONILE followed their realization that 
rescinding the colonial-era water treaties would only result in likely international 
sanctions on water projects in their respective countries. TECCONILE mooted projects 
such as the Nile River Basin Action Plan (NRBAP), which included 22 technical 
assistance and capacity building projects worth over $100 million. The second project 
was the development of a cooperative framework for the management of the Nile with 
the support of the World Bank, which would lead and coordinate donor support.127  This 
cooperative framework led to the creation of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) in 1999. 
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C. CONCLUSION 
As we have seen, resolving questions about Nile water control and utilization 
entails breaking Egypt’s hegemony to allow for negotiations on equitable redistribution 
and utilization. A number of challenges hinder this: Egypt’s military and economic 
power, Egypt’s support from the international community given its political and strategic 
significance, and political instability and economic underdevelopment among the 
upstream states. On the one hand, the upstream states’ efforts towards a cooperative 
framework have, in the past, been hampered by ideological differences among member 
states, financial constraints, and political instability. On the other hand, Egypt’s 
disruptive efforts have seen the diversion of agendas to cooperation in projects only 
remotely connected to water, while its military and economic strength assures that via its 
intimidation and international influence it can neuter challenges to its monopoly over the 
Nile’s waters. 
Although the prospect for a cooperative framework on the Nile remains weak, 
Egyptian hegemony is unlikely to survive worsening climate change and environmental 
degradation, population growth, food insecurity, urbanization, and underemployment in 
the region. These trends combine to threaten security in the Nile basin countries. 
Increased competition for the shared scarce water resource has the potential to raise the 
risk of inter-state conflict. Egypt’s latest attempt to encourage and finance alternative 
water sources—such as borehole drilling—in upstream states helps it to sustain its control 
over the Nile flow, but only temporarily. It, therefore, remains a challenge to find an 
equitable way to share the Nile’s water. 
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V. THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE NILE BASIN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The present situation in the Nile basin reflects a blend, with a cooperative 
framework to utilize the Nile water represented by the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), the 
evolution of regionalism represented by the East African Community (EAC), and 
unilateralism in water projects as exhibited by such countries as Egypt, Uganda, and 
Ethiopia. While NBI’s basin-wide cooperative framework aims to realize a shared vision 
of “sustainable socioeconomic development through the equitable utilization of, and 
benefit from, the common Nile basin water resources,”128 the EAC’s emergence, which 
brings together the countries of Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Burundi, and Rwanda, has the 
Nile as one of its central development concerns in recognition of the fact that existing 
tensions over Nile water use could worsen if countries pursue unilateral projects. The 
unilateral undertaking of water projects by Egypt and Ethiopia, for instance, could be 
attributed to their plans to secure a “prior use” advantage in the face of NBI deliberations. 
B. THE NILE BASIN INITIATIVE (NBI) 
Launched in 1999, the NBI seeks equitable use of Nile waters based on the 
provisions of Article 5 of the United Nations Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses 
of International Watercourses. Associated with the NBI negotiations is the expectation 
countries will embrace the theory of restricted sovereignty by each state in recognition of 
the rights of other co-riparian states, as well as adoption of joint management of the 
basin. The member countries are Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, 
Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, with Eritrea as an observer. 
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According to Peter Kagwanja, “The Nile Basin Initiative has thus emerged as a 
meeting point between regionalism and internationalism”129 on Nile water use. The 
World Bank, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and Canadian 
International Development Agency (CIDA) are NBI development partners, with the 
World Bank responsible for coordination of donor support. The international community 
recognizes the Nile basin as a potential flashpoint in international politics. The 
engagement of world development organizations is envisaged to promote NBI objectives 
of realizing economic cooperation among the riparian states, with the implication that the 
NBI would contribute to stability and conflict prevention in the region.130 The 
international community’s support could help forestall the likely refugee problems 
occasioned by hunger, poverty, or conflict over the shared resource, as well as save on 
the cost of peacekeeping operations if the water dispute degenerates to war among the 
riparian states. 
The obstacle to the realization of NBI basin-wide cooperation is the conflicting 
positions between upstream and downstream states as regards the legality of colonial-era 
Nile treaties, and participants’ commitment to NBI objectives. Egypt and Sudan are 
advocating for recognition of their historic rights in the NBI articles, a position that the 
upstream states oppose with their call for equitable water allocation. This suggests that 
until the Nile basin states see incentives for common basin-wide development projects, 
the proclivity to avoid joint project initiatives will prevail. It was with this realization that 
the NBI adopted a sub-basin approach to resolving the Nile basin question, taking cues 
from the Lower Mekong Basin initiative.  
1. The Lower Mekong Basin Initiative 
The members of the Lower Mekong Basin Initiative are the downstream states of 
Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, and Cambodia. Formed in 1995, this Initiative excluded the 
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upstream states of China and Burma (Myanmar), which held observer status,131 because 
of their lack of interest in a cooperative framework. China pursued development of 
alternative river basins in its territory, for example, the Three Gorges Dam, while Burma 
for its part had no incentive to join the Initiative because the catchment area within its 
territory was under rebel (Karen National Union) control.132 This initiative, did, 
however, make a provision for other riparian states to join it if they agreed to abide by the 
rights and obligations of the initiative, since at the time of its formation, not all the 
riparian states shared a common vision of economic development and peace in the region. 
2. The NBI Subsidiary Programs 
Due to the differences between the upstream states and the downstream states, in 
a basin-wide cooperative framework the NBI realized that a sub-basin approach like that 
of the Mekong Initiative might be best since the importance of the Nile is not uniform 
across the riparian states. The NBI has therefore unveiled two sub-basin programs to 
pursue hydroelectric projects – the Eastern Nile Subsidiary Action Program (ENSAP) 
and the Nile Equatorial Lakes Subsidiary Action program (NELSAP). The NELSAP 
brings together Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya, Rwanda, DRC, and Burundi in a power 
generation and trade plan. The Rusumo Falls hydropower project on  the Kagera river in 
Rwanda, is one of the projects planned under NELSAP.133 Countries in the NELSAP 
sub-basin are presumed to be more concerned with the preservation of the rivers and 
lakes in their region. The hyacinth weed, for example, threatens the existence of in Lake 
Victoria, as do the deforestation activities in the water catchment areas in these upstream 
states. To this end, Egypt has entered a bilateral agreement with Uganda to eradicate the 
water hyacinth weed in Lakes Victoria, Kyoga, and Albert. 
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ENSAP for its part, brings together Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia (and Eritrea at a 
later date). The NBI sub-basin approach foreshadows the upstream states’ demand for 
renegotiation of the treaties for water sharing, and targets achieving consensus on the less 
controversial issue of hydropower generation and trade with the aim of achieving power 
sector integration. As for ENSAP, the NBI advocates the construction of dams in Sudan 
and Ethiopia because of their hydropower potential and lower evaporation rates, and to 
prevent silt concentration in Lake Nasser. Better water storage dams in Ethiopia and 
Sudan could increase the water availability for Egypt by up to 15 million cubic meters 
per year.134 
Some of the NBI member countries view the NBI approach of postponing the 
renegotiation of the Nile treaties and pursuit of superficial cooperation in sub-basin 
projects as likely to fail. Ethiopia has warned that, “In fact, the failure of NBI would 
mean more mistrust and suspicion among the riparian states, frustration on the part of the 
facilitators, and a full-fledged unilateralism, which would be a recipe for a conflict over 
the utilization of the Nile waters.”135 
C. THE EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY (EAC) 
The East African countries of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania have had the issue of 
fair sharing of the Nile waters as one of their central themes since the creation of a 
customs union in 1967, which became defunct in 1977 due to ideological differences as 
Kenya pursued state capitalism, Uganda had a ‘socialist charter’, and Tanzania pursued 
Ujamaa.136 The revival of the EAC in 2001 signaled a re-emergence of regionalism in 
the Nile basin, particularly as Rwanda and Burundi also joined as members. The goals of 
the EAC include regional development and conflict resolution. 
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In addressing the development challenge, the EAC has focused on the use of Lake 
Victoria and its catchment areas for food and hydroelectricity in a “peaceful and secure 
environment.”137 The EAC established the Lake Victoria Environmental Management 
Project to coordinate the activities of its member countries so as to avoid unilateral 
projects that could create tensions.138 The EAC is expected to end internal divisions 
among the member states and strengthen their bargaining power against Egyptian and 
Sudanese monopoly of Nile waters. 
The EAC countries have raised their concerns regarding the Nile in both their 
rhetoric and by unilateral action. In the past, Kenya and Tanzania have renounced the 
1929 Nile treaty and, in response, Egypt has threatened war and economic sanctions. In 
2004, Tanzania unilaterally undertook a $27.6 million water project in Lake Victoria and, 
in the same year, Uganda questioned Egypt’s monopoly.139 Water stress in the region has 
led to devastating droughts and lower electricity productivity. Environmental concerns, 
including deforestation of catchment areas such as the Mau complex in Kenya and the 
degradation of Lake Victoria due to the water hyacinth, have also made water a top 
priority policy issue for the EAC, which makes the claim for equitable utilization of the 
Nile’s waters an inevitable political concern.140 
D. UNILATERALISM 
Although the NBI represents a move towards a cooperative framework among the 
Nile basin countries, and the EAC reflects a regional approach to the Nile question, some 
countries have sometimes resorted to unilateral action in the face of Egypt’s clinging to 
the contentious Nile treaties. As a member of NBI, Egypt has accepted most of the 
decisions in the framework, but insists that the water agreements in existence are as fixed 
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as border agreements. Egypt has, therefore, continued to expand its irrigation schemes 
with the recent ones being the Southern Valley and the North Sinai Development 
Projects, which will draw an additional 20 billion cubic meters of water annually. 
Opposing Egypt’s position, Uganda and Ethiopia have demanded 18 billion cubic meters 
of the Nile water from Egyptian and Sudanese allotments.141  
Frustrated by Egypt’s unrelenting stance, Tanzania embarked on a $27.6 million 
water project in 2004 to draw water from Lake Victoria, asserting that the existing 
treaties are illegal and immoral in the face of water stress in the upstream states, where 
the sources of the Nile water originate. In 2006, following Tanzania’s precedent, Kenya 
declared its intention to utilize Lake Victoria waters or control the flow of its rivers that 
feed the lake in order to feed its rising population—32 million in 2008, expected to reach 
45 million by 2015—amidst worsening cycles of drought.142 
Uganda has also decided to undertake a 250MW hydroelectric project at 
Bujagali,143 in contravention of the Nile treaties. The electricity to be produced is 
expected to augment the current supply of 180MW from Owen Falls and 120MW from 
the Kiira hydroelectric projects, and supply both Uganda and Kenya. Although Uganda’s 
move and intended supply to Kenya may suggest power sector integration in East Africa, 
this is not being undertaken under the NBI but rather unilaterally. As Uganda continues 
with the Bujagali project, politicians across East Africa are calling out for more sharing, 
with an option whereby Egypt would compensate the upstream states for its water 
supplies.144  
Aware of Egypt’s threat of war and its strategy to keep Ethiopia in a weakened 
position through destabilization, Ethiopia decided to undertake numerous micro-dam 
projects that would not only compromise Egyptian water security, but would also be 
immune to Egyptian military targeting.  Egypt’s concern is that Ethiopia’s water projects 
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could reduce downstream flow as much as 15 percent, a level completely unacceptable to 
Egypt.145  Individually, each state considers its survival the overarching objective. One 
significant fact arising from Egypt’s support of Eritrea’s secession from Ethiopia in 1993 
is that Ethiopia is now landlocked and has to depend on Eritrea (not yet possible), 
Djibouti, or Somalia for overland access to the sea.146 Ethiopia is negotiating from a 
position of disadvantage as Eritrea is allied with Egypt, and Somalia remains embroiled 
in civil war. Also important are the international politics involved regarding the Red 
Sea’s strategic value as a sea route. For example, a key concern that led to United States 
support to Ethiopia versus Eritrea was that Muslim Eritrea would join the Arab countries 
and could (as Nasser did with the Suez Canal in 1956) use it as a weapon, by shutting off 
access to it, with the result that Israel would be held hostage.147 It is such strategic 
leverage that Egypt uses by proxy through Eritrea to weaken Ethiopia. But nonetheless, 
lately Ethiopia has unilaterally engaged in hydro-dam projects including Tekeze 
(300MW), Gilgel Gibe II (420MW), Beles (460MW), and Gilgel Gibe III (1870MW).148 
Ethiopia expects to sell about 40 per cent of its surplus power to Kenya, Sudan, and 
Djibouti by 2012, and anticipates earning over $30 million annually from Sudan alone.   
Pursuing unilateral projects on the Nile by the various states would, as Winston 
Churchill predicted, lead the Nile to “. . . perish gloriously and never reach the sea.”149 
Individual state survival thus far has trumped collective action in the Nile River Basin.  
However, it appears Egypt and Sudan have too short-sighted a view.  Without a 
resolution through the NBI, upper riparian states are reaching a point where, in order to 
preserve their survival, they see no other choice but to irrigate and dam up tributaries, 
regardless of actions threatened by Egypt. For the past ten years, the upper riparian states 
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have attempted to address their concerns through the NBI without a successful resolution 
thanks to stonewalling by Egypt and Sudan.  In a worst-case scenario, the absence of a 
resolution could result in a downward spiral of violent measures on each state’s part for 
its security and survival, especially should it perceive it has no other remaining 
alternative. Unilateralism may be the first step. 
E. IMPACT OF REGIONALISM AND UNILATERALISM 
Even as Egypt and Sudan continue to claim that the Nile treaties are sacrosanct, 
one can see more flexibility in their foreign policy – in the provision of grants to 
upstream states and the promotion of regional peace—perhaps in realization of its 
strategic vulnerability if the Aswan High Dam were to be attacked. Memory of Israel’s 
1967 threat of airstrike on the dam has to play a role in how Egypt reassesses its stance 
against the upstream states. As Elhance observes, were the Aswan dam to break, “. . . 110 
billion gallons of water would be sent downstream in massive waves, destroying 
everything in its path in Egypt all the way to the Mediterranean Sea.”150 
Egypt’s new strategy to sponsor development of alternative source water projects 
in upstream states thus makes sense. For example, between 1996 – 2001 Egypt provided 
a $4.2 million grant to Kenya for groundwater wells. It has also provided $13.9 million to 
Uganda in the form of equipment and machinery to combat aquatic weeds in Lakes 
Victoria, Kyoga and the Nile.151 This involvement in upstream states’ water projects 
enables Egypt to monitor and control upstream states’ use of the Nile through 
cooperation. Egypt’s softened stance may also be due to the realization that, first, 
upstream hydropower facilities will not decrease the flow of the Nile, while having the 
positive effect of reducing sedimentation reaching Aswan High Dam. Second, availability 
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of hydropower to upstream states could also help them tap into underground water.152 
Egypt’s dominance appears to be an eroding force, helped by the evident shift of its 
economy from agriculture towards an increase in trade with other riparian states.153 The 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), of which all the co-
riparian states are members, could boost cooperation among them. 
Notably, Egypt has also been involved in the Darfur peace process and has 
contributed to the Peacekeeping Missions in Darfur and South Sudan, UNAMID and 
UNMIS, although its “strategic interests in the Nile remain intact.”154 The threat of 
Sudan splitting spells doom for Egypt’s attempts at federation with the Sudan, something 
that could result in an even powerful downstream force just given the population, and 
economic and military might, the federation would have at its disposal.155 Egypt’s move 
to promote peace and unity in Sudan represents a “strategic decision to ensure that Sudan 
remains as one state bound by existing treaties on the Nile waters.”156 In the event that 
South Sudan votes to secede in the 2011 referendum, Egypt will have to broker another 
Nile water use deal with Southern Sudan since it will not be a party to the 1959 bilateral 
treaty. This will, instead, add strength to the upstream states’ camp. 
F. THE AFRICAN UNION (AU) ON SHARED WATER RESOURCES 
The inauguration of the AU in 2002 as the primary means of promoting peace, 
security, and stability in Africa, saw the establishment of a 15-member Peace and 
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Security Council (PSC) in 2004.  AU member countries anticipated that “this smaller 
committee of big minds”157 would guarantee effective decision-making in conflict 
management,158 including the provision of guidelines on the use and management of 
shared resources in ways that would reduce tensions. In Article V (2) of its convention on 
the conservation of nature and natural resources, the AU guides member states to 
consultations to resolve disputes on trans-boundary waters: 
Where . . . water resources are shared by two or more of the Contracting 
States, the latter shall act in consultation, and if the need arises, set up 
inter-state Commissions to study and resolve problems from the joint use 
of these resources, and for the joint development and conservation 
thereof.159 
While the AU convention recommends strengthening regional organizations to 
address shared resources, and the establishment of an Inter-governmental Committee on 
Water for Africa,160 it stops short of initiating a review of the contentious colonial-era 
treaties that are at the heart of the continuing Nile water dispute. Nonetheless, provisions 
of the AU inform the EAC and NBI, especially its offer to dispose of contentious matters 
relating to natural resources that may be brought to its attention by member states.161 
 G. CONCLUSION 
In seeking to resolve the Nile use dispute, the NBI is building confidence among 
the co-riparian states by inculcating a shared vision of sustainable exploitation of the 
Nile. The NBI has not, however, been able to correct the skewed legal regime of water 
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use, thereby prompting the escalating tension between the EAC countries and Ethiopia on 
the one hand, and Egypt and Sudan on the other. The EAC regional structure suggests a 
possible move beyond state-centeredness, and could open the way to multilateralism as 
the member countries adopt a common front in the quest for equitable access to Nile 
water. 
Tackling the Nile treaties question is far from over and, if unchecked, the issue of 
water rights in the Nile River Basin can yet intensify into potential regional conflict.  
Egypt’s refusal to compromise has galvanized upstream states to act in concert to address 
their concerns over water rights.  While it is commendable that Egypt has offered to help 
finance the pursuit of alternative technologies and conservation in these states, it falls 
short of a real solution and, as expected, has been met with skepticism by the upstream 
states.  Perhaps it might be worth the effort for the NBI to consider inviting the AU to 
formulate an international African Charter of Trans-Boundary Waters to override the 
colonial-based laws. 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION 
This study has brought to the fore the fact that the Nile basin is one of the 
potential “flashpoints in contemporary international relations.”162 According to Cooke 
and Downie, “the number and cost of African conflicts have declined over the course of 
the past decade . . . .”163 However, with the rise in population, deteriorating climatic 
conditions with increased unpredictability and unreliability of rainfall and falling water 
levels in the Nile, there is a worsening situation of food insecurity, as well as poverty and 
unemployment as a result of underdeveloped economies. Consequently, interstate conflict 
among the Nile basin countries over Nile as a shared water resource is likely, as the 
demand-and supply-induced scarcity is exacerbated by the structural-induced scarcity 
emanating from the contested colonial-era treaties that favor Egypt (Figure 2). The 
circumstances of the likelihood of conflict are depicted in Table 1. 
In spite of efforts towards a cooperative framework, water security as a “national 
concern” continues to override the common-good principle for the sake of a regional 
citizenry. Egypt built the Aswan High Dam instead of supporting the proposed Century 
Storage Scheme for the Great Lakes region despite the fact that the Century Storage 
Scheme promised lower evaporation rates and would have benefitted the entire region. 
Currently, Egypt is evasive about proposals for equitable utilization by the upstream 
states, arguing that such proposals should acknowledge Egypt’s historic rights. Egypt’s 
moves, then and now, are a product of fear of dependence—and its belief that 
dependence would constitute strategic weakness. It is Egypt’s position, played against the  
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upstream states’ position of adopting a cooperative framework to supersede existing 
treaties and institutionalize the principle of equitable utilization that has led to the current 
stalemate in resolving the Nile dispute.  
The international community has leverage to help find a solution to the Nile 
dispute. The international community’s intervention is necessary to prevent conflict that 
would destabilize the region, add to the call for peace enforcement and peacekeeping 
support to the continent, and worsen refugee problems. As well, equitable utilization of 
the Nile water would reduce the food aid dependency by some upstream states on the 
international community. With some of the Nile basin countries highly indebted, 
pursuing a “debt-for-cooperation” swap might help unlock the current stalemate on the 
Nile treaties renegotiation. So far, the international community including, world 
organizations such as UNDP, UNEP, UN, and the World Bank, and the regional 
organizations such as the AU and EAC, have helped ameliorate the interstate tensions 
among the Nile basin countries through the provision of emergency food aid, technical 
assistance, and facilitation of conferences. 
It is, after all, conflicting international water law principles that sustain the present 
Nile dispute. Egypt is determined to maintain the status quo by holding onto the principle 
of absolute territorial integrity (with the claim that a lower riparian state has a right to a 
river’s natural flow), the principle of prior appropriation (whoever uses the water first 
establishes a claim or right to it), and the principle of no significant harm. The confluence 
of these principles supports Egypt’s veto power over use of the Nile, as does its argument 
of total dependence on the Nile. The argument of the upstream states, on the other hand, 
rests on the principle of absolute sovereignty (absolute rights over rivers flowing through 
a country’s territory), the principle of limited territorial sovereignty (reflecting riparian 
co-dependence), and the principle of equitable allocation. In the past, disputes between 
countries over water have been resolved through mediation or the International Court of 
Justice. A United States presidential envoy mediated the 1953 Israeli, Jordan, Lebanon, 
and Syria standoff over the right to use Jordan River water. In 1975, Saudi Arabia 
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mediated the Syria-Iraq dispute over the flow of the Euphrates River.164 The 
International Court of Justice arbitrated the Danube river dispute between Hungary and 
Slovakia in 1997. 
Despite several attempts, the upstream states in the Nile basin have not managed 
to form sufficiently robust organizations to renegotiate the Nile water agreements for 
better access to and use of the Nile’s water. The lack of a resolution arbitration 
mechanism has left Egypt and Sudan to continue monopolizing the Nile. Yet, worsening 
climatic conditions and rising populations will remain major contributing factors to a 
decline in water availability throughout the Nile basin, a situation that has compelled 
some upstream states to embark on unilateral water projects on the Nile. The upstream 
states’ vulnerability to water scarcity is increased because they lack projects to capture 
and store freshwater. The power asymmetry between upstream states and downstream 
states combines with the fact that the upstream states’ actions can produce negative 
consequences for the more powerful downstream states, and thus can lead to armed 
conflict.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
• To give impetus to the stalled upstream-downstream states negotiations, 
the Nile basin states should present the Nile water dispute to the AU for 
arbitration. 
• Alongside pursuing renegotiation of the Nile water treaties, the riparian 
states should explore other sources of water such as underground water 
and rainwater harvesting to militate against deficiencies in their respective 
countries. 
• The International Community should intervene more proactively in 
resolving the water dispute. The downstream states currently exercising 
influence in the basin should recognize the imperative to accept a water 
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regime in line with the interests of the whole basin, given the geographical 
configuration of the basin and the changing geopolitics. 
• All of the Nile basin countries should work towards a basin-wide 
cooperative framework with sub-basin projects initiated according to 
regional factor endowments, thereby creating interdependence. Production 
of hydropower and food according to who has a comparative advantage 
will help realize the “virtual water” concept through trade. 
• There is a need for individual countries to consider creating incentives for 
smaller families to slow rapid population growth. 
• Each country should undertake measures that reduce the destruction of 
water catchment areas, including poverty reduction, a factor that drives 
people to misuse water catchment areas in their bid to secure a livelihood. 
• Individual countries should implement laws to regulate/prohibit water 
pollution and degradation. Joint conservation policies and a joint water 
management system that provides for the resolution of conflicts should be 
engrained in the Nile Basin Initiative. 
• Pursuit of desalination efforts by economically strong nations, particularly 
Egypt, and the adoption of efficient water technologies could help 
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